What You See is What You Do: Imagery and the Moral Judgements of Individuals with OCD by Trafford, Alexia
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
What You See is What You Do: Imagery and the Moral Judgements of Individuals 
with OCD 
 
 
 
Alexia Trafford 
June, 2016 
 
 
 
 
Research submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor 
in Clinical Psychology (DClinPsy), Royal Holloway, University of London. 
 2 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to thank Dr Abigail Wroe for her continued encouragement, expertise 
and support with this thesis over the last two years. I would also like to thank Dr Olga 
Luzon for her guidance and support, particularly during the development of the study.   
I would like to acknowledge my parents, who have been a source of continued 
support throughout the writing of this thesis and have both played a great part in my 
chosen career. Without them, I would not have the privilege to do what I do each day.  
My deepest thanks also goes to my husband Jonathan, whose unwavering support, 
patience and presence has been enormously helpful in the journey so far. 
Finally, a sincere thank you to all the people who took part in the study, the 
organisations that supported it, and to all those who have given me words of 
encouragement along the way. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
Abstract 
A key feature of OCD is the occurrence of compulsions that are viewed to ‘prevent 
some objectively unlikely event, often involving harm’ (ICD 10, F42). In improving 
our understanding of these compulsions, researchers have begun to explore the moral 
judgements of individuals with OCD. It has been proposed that these individuals 
make moral judgements using more deontological, rather than utilitarian, principles 
(Franklin, McNally & Riemann, 2009; Mancini & Gangemi, 2015). That is, in moral 
dilemmas, individuals with OCD tend to make judgements based on the morality of 
actions involved as opposed to the outcome for the greater good. Furthermore, 
visualising an image has been linked to making deontological judgements, in non-
clinical populations (Amit & Greene, 2012). This study investigated moral 
judgements in OCD and the impact of imagery on these judgements. It was 
hypothesised that imagery would mediate the association between OCD and moral 
judgements. One hundred and forty-five participants (including 30 with OCD and 27 
in a non-OCD comparison group) were recruited online and completed questions on 
moral dilemmas that required them to choose between deontological and utilitarian 
options. The utilitarian option required them to choose to act, causing the deaths of 
fewer people but saving the lives of many. The deontological option did not involve 
acting, but resulted in more deaths. A greater presence of OCD symptomatology was 
associated with making more deontological judgements, when considering some 
dilemmas. However, when compared by group, individuals with OCD did not make 
significantly more deontological judgements than individuals in the comparison 
group. Whilst imagery was found to have a relationship with moral judgements in 
certain dilemmas, this did not mediate the relationship between OCD and moral 
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judgements. The results suggest an association between moral reasoning and OCD, 
not mediated by imagery, and are therefore considered in relation to other theoretical 
explanations.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Overview 
Individuals with Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) often worry about harm 
coming to themselves or others, and feel responsible for preventing it. Models of 
OCD suggest that the occurrence of an intrusion is a normal phenomenon (Rachman 
& de Silva, 1978), which acts as a trigger to the awareness of potential harm. In this 
way, the intrusion triggers a decision as to whether or not to act to prevent the harm 
(Wroe & Salkovskis, 2000). The Cognitive Behavioural Model of OCD proposes that 
a heightened sense of responsibility is a key factor in the maintenance of OCD 
(Salkovskis, 1985; 1989) as it leads the individual to an increased sense of 
responsibility in response to the occurrence of intrusions, particularly for potential 
harm. This results in the individual feeling compelled to act to prevent adverse 
outcomes and contributes to maintaining the cycle of compulsive behaviours 
(Salkovskis, 1985). Making a decision about acting in response to an intrusion about 
potential harm requires an individual to make a decision as to what is right or wrong.  
A moral judgement is a judgement concerned with right or wrong (Oxford 
English Minidictionary, Clarendon Press, 1997) therefore a judgement of 
responsibility for potential harm can be considered a moral judgment (Shaver, 1985 as 
cited in Pizarro, Ulmann & Bloom, 2003). For example, one person may perceive 
doing nothing to prevent potential harm as acceptable, whereas another person may 
perceive that it is acceptable only to do everything they can to prevent it from 
occurring. In this way, moral judgements contribute towards decision making about 
actions and, ultimately, the initiation of action (Bandura, 1991).  
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Researchers have suggested that moral judgements can be influenced by 
‘omission bias’ (Ritov & Baron, 1999; Spranca, Minsk and Baron, 1991), which is the 
phenomena that people generally judge harm that occurs through inaction (failing to 
act) as more acceptable than harm resulting from action (Ritov & Baron, 1999; 
Spranca et al., 1991). Omission has been considered a part of responsibility (Wroe & 
Salkovskis, 2000), and has been demonstrated to influence decision making regarding 
action or inaction in the face of potential harm. For example, if an individual comes to 
harm themselves by stepping on broken glass on a path, most people feel that them 
having seen the broken glass on the path and not removing it would be more 
acceptable than placing the glass there themselves. Research has begun to help us to 
understand the role of moral judgements in people with OCD by demonstrating that 
individuals with OCD judge both these scenarios to be equally unacceptable, in 
situations that activate their idiosyncratic OCD concerns (Wroe & Salkovskis, 2000).  
Research has also begun to propose that individuals with OCD use other 
reasoning processes to make moral judgements. Franklin, McNally and Riemann 
(2009) found individuals with OCD to make more decisions based on individual 
rights and the quality of the action involved, in comparison to people without OCD, 
who tend to make more decisions based on the greater good and overall outcomes, in 
moral dilemmas. This is supported by Mancini and Gangemi (2015) who found 
individuals with OCD to be more motivated to avoid feelings of guilt as a 
consequence of acting to harm an individual, in comparison to those without OCD.   
 In nonclinical populations, having an image in mind when making a decision 
in a moral dilemma has been linked to people making decisions based on the action 
involved, rather than the overall result (Amit & Greene, 2012). In other words, when 
 14 
considering acting to end an individual’s life for the purpose of saving a group, 
having an image of the individual supports the judgement that saving the group does 
not justify ending the life of the individual. It is also known that visual representations 
are more emotionally salient (Holmes & Mathews, 2005) and emotions are 
specifically implicated in highlighting moral dilemmas (Horberg, Oveis & Keltner, 
2011). As individuals with OCD commonly experience intrusive images it is possible 
that these affect their moral judgements even more so than in those without OCD.  
It would seem that there are differences in the ways that individuals with and 
without OCD make judgements in moral dilemmas. An enhanced understanding of 
how individuals with OCD make these judgements, and if imagery is implicated in 
this process, could help us develop even greater insight into compulsive behaviours 
associated with OCD and inform the treatments we are able to provide.  
This chapter will review the literature in these areas, beginning with a 
consideration of the prevalence and impact of OCD and followed by a consideration 
of the implications of responsibility and decision making in the disorder. It will then 
consider the research on moral judgements and explain how this is relevant to OCD. 
Finally, it will consider the contributions of imagery and emotion and how this could 
help us to refine our understanding. The review will conclude with an outline of the 
present study.  
1.2 Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder 
The ICD-10 (2016, F42) describes the essential features of OCD to be ‘recurrent 
obsessional thoughts or compulsive acts’. It describes obsessional thoughts to be 
‘ideas, images, or impulses that enter the patient’s mind again and again’ and notes 
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that they are ‘distressing and the patient often tries, unsuccessfully, to resist them’. It 
describes the function of compulsive acts as being to ‘prevent some objectively 
unlikely event, often involving harm to or caused by the patient’. Finally, it notes that 
‘If compulsive acts are resisted anxiety gets worse’. In the short term therefore, these 
behaviours reduce anxiety levels and act as positive reinforcement. However, in this 
way, the individual does not experience the outcome resulting from not engaging in 
compulsive behaviours and evidence does not disconfirm the fear. This leads to the 
belief that the compulsion is the only way of coping.   
Being ranked as the tenth most debilitating illness in the world (WHO, 1999), 
OCD significantly interferes with people’s daily lives (Bobes et al., 2001). It is 
common for OCD to be comorbid with other mental health conditions as well as 
substance use disorders (Ruscio, Stein, Chiu & Kessler, 2010) and it is therefore 
associated with a poorer quality of life (Macy et al., 2013) and increased use of health 
services (Markarian et al., 2010). As we learn more about OCD, the complexity and 
diversity of the disorder is becoming clearer. There is evidence to suggest that 
tailoring treatment to specific presentations may be of benefit (Abramowitz, Franklin 
Schwartz & Furr, 2003) and it is therefore important to continue to strive for more a 
more in-depth understanding of the disorder. 
1.2.1 Theories of OCD 
Behavioural theories. Behavioural theories of OCD (Rachman, 1971) were 
the first attempt to explain the disorder. Behavioural theory states that obsessive 
thoughts begin as neutral stimuli that become associated with a feeling of anxiety. 
The association becomes learned and individuals with OCD use compulsive 
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behaviours to neutralise the unpleasant feeling. As a result of these behaviours, 
obsessive thoughts become negatively reinforced and compulsions are strengthened, 
making them more likely to intrude again in the future. Through this, individuals do 
not get the opportunity to learn what would happen if they were exposed to the 
obsessive thought and their fear is maintained.  
Behavioural theories contributed to the development of treatment for OCD, 
which initially involved exposure and response prevention. This consisted of 
individuals exposing themselves to their fears and preventing themselves from 
responding with compulsions, breaking the association. Treatments of this type had 
around a 50% response rate. However, it is now well documented that other factors, 
such as therapist reassurance and reduced responsibility on behalf of the individual, 
may have contributed to the reduction in anxiety (Gillihan, Williams, Malcoun, Yadin 
& Foa, 2013).  
Cognitive-behavioural theory. Salkovskis (1985; 1989) later highlighted the 
importance of cognitive factors, and in particular responsibility beliefs in the 
cognitive-behavioural (CB) model for OCD (see Figure 1.1). The CB model proposes 
that intrusions are common (Purdon & Clark, 1993; Rachman & de Silva, 1978) in 
people with and without OCD but the way in which intrusions are interpreted, for 
example, with a heightened perceived risk of harm and increased responsibility for the 
harm (Salkovskis, 1985, 1989; Steketee, Frost & Cohen, 1998) leads to increased 
anxiety and compulsive behaviours.   
Salkovskis, Rachman, Ladouceur and Freeston (1992, cited in Salkovskis, 
Richards & Forrester, 1995) defined responsibility as ‘the belief that one has the 
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power that is pivotal to bring about or prevent subjectively crucial negative outcomes. 
These outcomes may be actual, that is having consequences in the real world, and/or 
at a moral level’ p.285. According to this, if an individual feels as though they have 
the power to prevent a negative outcome, they will perceive themselves as being 
responsible for this and feel compelled to take action to prevent it. The CB model 
(Salkovskis, 1985; 1989) proposes that this solution becomes the problem.  
The CB model also highlights the role of counterproductive ‘safety 
behaviours’ such as thought suppression and avoidance and attentional biases such as 
hypervigilance to intrusions in the maintenance of the disorder. In addition, Steketee, 
Frost, Rheaume and Wilhelm (1998) highlight the implications of overestimation of 
threat, intolerance of uncertainty, thought-action fusion (TAF) and perfectionism 
often present in individuals with OCD. Rachman (1997) stated that individuals with 
OCD often feel their thoughts have more importance and personal significance and 
this, in combination with less flexibility of thought (Lawrence et al., 2006), makes it 
more difficult for them to generate alternative explanations for their intrusions. 
Previously developed beliefs towards responsibility and harm make intrusions more 
salient and OCD is maintained.  
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Figure 1.1 The Cognitive-Behavioural model of OCD from: Salkovskis et al., 
(2000). Responsibility attitudes and interpretations are characteristic of obsessive 
compulsive disorder, p.349. 
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CB models of OCD therefore propose the role of interpretations of intrusions 
as being key in the way that individuals respond to the awareness of potential risk. As 
individuals with OCD interpret intrusions with a heightened sense of responsibility 
and perceived awfulness, this affects the way in which they interpret moral dilemmas 
and raises the possibility that they make different judgements to individuals without 
the disorder.  
1.2.2 The role of responsibility in OCD. Research has focussed on 
understanding the key role of responsibility in OCD. Based on clinical experience and 
theoretical observations, Salkovskis, Shafran, Rachman and Freeston (1999) 
suggested that early experiences could influence the development of an increased 
sense of responsibility; explaining the meaning attached to intrusive thoughts in 
individuals with OCD. These experiences included having increased responsibility as 
a child, having to act according to strict rules, overprotective parenting, feelings of 
blame or accidental behaviour causing harm to someone. Salkovskis et al. (1999) 
suggested that beliefs about responsibility may develop in order to cope with these 
early experiences, enabling the development of healthy lives but also acting as a risk 
factor for the development of OCD.  
Empirical evidence has supported these theories of responsibility. Ladouceur 
et al. (1995) induced a perception of heightened responsibility into sixty non-clinical 
particpants by asking them to identify sounds of different lengths, used to support 
vulnerable people at road crossings. They were told that their errors could lead to 
harmful outcomes and were provided with fictitious statistics on recent accidents. 
Participants demonstrated more OCD-like behaviours and more concern about errors 
than controls however it was unclear whether this was due to responsibility or the 
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perception of danger. Further supporting the role of responsibility, individuals without 
OCD have been found to neutralise intrusive thoughts that are rated as strong in terms 
of responsibility (Freeston, Ladouceur, Gagnon & Thibodeau, 1993). Bouchard, 
Rheaume and Ladouceur (1999) found non-clinical participants who were ‘highly 
perfectionistic’ to feel more responsible for negative consequences and suggested 
perfectionism could predispose individuals to feel more responsible. Although this 
would have benefitted from replication in individuals with OCD as well as analysing 
the data using an experimental manipulation in order to make firmer conclusions, the 
authors suggested these findings were highly relevant to the CB model of OCD.  
By analysing CB models and clinical material, Salkovskis (1985) 
hypothesised that an individual with OCD’s general sense of responsibility could 
influence their interpretations of intrusions. He suggested that if an intrusive thought 
was combined with a heightened sense of responsibility it was interpreted as having 
more personal relevance and bringing more harm. Adding yet more support to the role 
of responsibility in OCD by looking at the empirical effect of removing responsibility, 
Lopatka and Rachman (1995) lowered the perceived responsibility of 30 participants 
with OCD, in situations that they would usually feel responsible, by assigning it to the 
researcher. Whilst not confirming how responsible participants felt after doing so, the 
authors found both urges to perform compulsions and distress decreased.  They 
suggested a link between responsibility and compulsive behaviours, which could have 
been strengthened had the authors used a specifically developed and validated 
measure of responsibility as opposed to a self-report measure. Looking at a similar 
area, Shafran (1997) found therapist absence induced more discomfort and 
compulsions when individuals experienced intrusive thoughts and Freeston et al. 
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(1993) found individuals with OCD to believe more strongly in beliefs related to 
responsibility than a control group. These findings have not been so pronounced in 
other anxiety disorders, leading to the conclusion that the role of responsibility is 
specific to OCD (Foa, Amir, Bogert, Molnar & Przeworski, 2001).  
1.2.3 Decision making in OCD. In combination with heightened sense of 
responsibility and associated responsibility related interpretations, the occurrence of 
intrusions about potential harm raises awareness to harm and requires a decision as to 
whether or not to act to prevent it (Wroe & Salkovskis, 2000). Whilst compulsive 
behaviours often seem automatic to individuals with OCD, these decisions are 
influenced by responsibility related intrusions that, nevertheless, require a 
determination of what feels to be the right course of action. It could then be assumed 
that this decision requires an analysis of right and wrong, in turn making it a moral 
judgement. In support of this, researchers have looked at moral judgements in people 
with and without OCD, and this has supported refinements in the understanding of 
decision-making in OCD.   
There is evidence to suggest that the decision-making process may differ in 
individuals with OCD, particularly as they focus more on perceived risks. Researchers 
have looked specifically at the role of factors that influence decisions in situations that 
trigger awareness of potential harm. Wroe and Salkovskis (2000) studied participants’ 
decisions about whether to act to prevent harm from occurring, in response to 
hypothetical moral dilemmas. They proposed that the occurrence of an intrusion 
raises an individual’s awareness to potential risks in a given situation such that the 
individual must then make a decision as to whether or not to act to prevent that harm. 
It was demonstrated that responsibility assumptions, such as ‘If I don’t act when I can 
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foresee danger, then I am to blame for any consequences’ (p. 1142), play a 
particularly important role in the maintenance of OCD by leading the person to decide 
to act to prevent possible harm (Salkovskis et al., 2000). The research concluded that 
decision-making abilities are not different between people with and without OCD per 
se, but that the factors used to make decisions are influenced by responsibility 
interpretations, thus leading to a difference in decision outcomes. In support of this, 
when compared to non-clinical individuals, individuals with OCD have been shown 
to have increased levels of activity in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Baxter et al., 
1988), an area essential for decision making (Damasio, 1994), when making 
decisions. They have also been shown to use less psychological flexibility in decision 
making (Lawrence et al., 2006), adding weight to the argument that it is decision 
making processes that may differ between individuals with and without OCD, as 
opposed to their decision making abilities per se (Neilen, Veltman, de Jong, Mulder & 
den Boer, 2002). Deciding whether or not to act to prevent harm implies an 
assessment of what the correct thing is to do and differences in decision making 
processes suggest that individuals with OCD might make these moral judgements in a 
different way to those without OCD.  In understanding the decision making process, it 
can be useful therefore to consider the literature on moral judgements.   
1.3 Moral Judgements 
1.3.1 Moral judgements in the general population. Individuals often spend 
time thinking about the behaviour of others and whether their actions are right or 
wrong (Boehm, 1999 as cited in Haidt, 2001). These judgements are guided by moral 
values formed in early life (Darley, 1993) and shaped through experience (Turiel, 
Killen & Helwig, 1987). Moral judgements can also be influenced by personality 
 23 
traits such as agreeableness, perfectionism (Yang, Steober & Wang, 2015) and 
conscientiousness, which have been shown to be important in shaping decisions in 
line with societal moral norms (Walker, 1999).  Consistent with these findings, 
individuals low in these personality traits have been found to engage more in 
behaviours deemed to be morally unacceptable (Karim, Zamzuri & Nor, 2009). 
Furthermore, emotional arousal and positive affect have been shown to aid the 
identification of moral dilemmas and their resolution in line with the individual’s 
morals, by engaging ‘more sophisticated moral structures’ (Gaudine & Thorne, 2001).  
The way in which people make moral judgements has been an important topic 
of study for several decades (Thomson, 1985). One dilemma referred to in the 
literature known as ‘the trolley dilemma’, is often used to consider moral judgements. 
In this scenario, a fast moving trolley is due to hit and kill five people if it carries on 
moving along its tracks. The only way to save the five people is to switch a switch, 
which changes the direction of the trolley, onto an alternative track. However, if the 
trolley switches to this alternative route, it will hit and kill one person. The individual 
is asked to consider which option is more acceptable, or which option they may 
choose.  
‘The footbridge dilemma’ (Thomson, 1985) outlines another commonly cited 
dilemma. In this case, a fast moving trolley is due to hit and kill five people. The 
people can be saved if another individual is pushed from a footbridge onto the trolley. 
This would stop the trolley from killing five people, but would kill the person pushed. 
When asked whether an action is morally acceptable or not, for example, whether it is 
acceptable to push the individual from the footbridge, or to switch the switch and kill 
one person instead of five, there seem to be differences in people’s answers 
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(Thomson, 1985). In the trolley dilemma, most people think it is acceptable to kill one 
person to save the lives of five. However in the footbridge dilemma, most people 
think it’s unacceptable to push and kill the person, in order to save the lives of five. 
Research has aimed to better understand these differences and understand why it 
seems acceptable to kill a person in one dilemma, but not the other.  
The dilemma people often face is in being asked to make a decision between 
favouring the rights of the individual (i.e., the individual being pushed) and the 
benefit of the ‘greater good’ (i.e., the five people). One suggestion, which attempts to 
explain the differences in answers across scenarios, is that the footbridge dilemma 
engages people’s emotions, in a way that the trolley dilemma does not (Greene, 
Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley & Cohen, 2001). It is suggested that the thought of 
pushing someone to his or her death induces more emotion than the thought of 
switching a switch. This suggests that some moral dilemmas engage emotional 
processing to a greater extent than others, and this affects moral judgements.  
Another explanation for the findings of the trolley dilemma is that the ratio of 
5:1 is influential in people’s decision. Gangemi and Mancini (2013) changed this ratio 
to 5:3 and found the percentage of people making decisions in favour of the 
individual changed to 50% (Gangemi, personal communication, September 21, 2015). 
In order to understand these different explanations, it can be helpful to consider the 
ways in which these judgements are made in more detail.  
Moral judgements have historically been thought to occur outside of 
consciousness and be emotionally driven (Freud, 1976). Empirical data shows 
humans to make judgements in milliseconds, even before giving the decision 
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conscious thought (Willis & Todorov, 2006).  Furthermore, Hume (1960) proposed 
that moral judgements are largely influenced by ‘gut feelings’ as research showed 
individuals to have an automatic feeling of approval or disapproval when making a 
moral judgement. Albeit only in ‘hypnotisable’ participants, Wheatley and Haidt 
(2005) furthered this by inducing feelings of disgust and found this lead to more 
judgements of an action in a moral dilemma being morally wrong, supporting the 
suggestion that moral judgements are closely linked with emotion. Neuroimaging 
evidence further confirmed this by showing brain regions associated with emotion to 
be activated whilst nine individuals made moral judgements (Greene et al., 2001).  
Others, however, have contrasting views stating that individuals are aware of 
making moral judgements, and that they use explicit reasoning for this (Kohlberg, 
1969; Piaget, 1932). In support of this, cognitive effort (Kohlberg, 1984) and 
intellectual ability (Moore, Clark & Kane, 2008) have been found to be key 
components of moral judgements. Kohlberg stated that moral judgements are 
developed through an explicit learning process; for example, taking on different roles 
and attempting to understand dilemmas from different points of view. Of note, is that 
it is not clear whether the role of emotion was also considered in this research.   
This diverging evidence highlights a tension in the research. Whether to do 
with emotional salience or explicit reasoning, people have been seen to vary in their 
inclination to make judgements in the favour of individual rights or in favour of the 
greater good (Greene et al., 2001). In the literature, these types of decisions are 
termed deontological and utilitarian judgements respectively (Amit & Greene, 2012).  
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A deontological judgement is a decision based on the morality of an action, 
where the quality of the action is more important than the consequences. A 
deontological decision would be the ‘right’ thing to do, even if that produced more 
harm than doing the ‘wrong’ thing. For example, it would be wrong to lie, in order to 
save a friend from a murderer. People who make deontological decisions judge that 
moral values should not be broken, whatever the reason (Kant, 1785 as cited in 
Szekely & Miu, 2015), and that individual rights should be key in making decisions 
(Kant, 1785).  
In opposition, a utilitarian decision is one that benefits the greater good (Mill, 
1998). To an individual making a utilitarian decision, morality is decided by the good 
in an action’s outcome; thus killing a person is acceptable, if multiple others are saved 
(Mill, 1998). Utilitarian judgements are also referred to in the literature as ‘altruistic’ 
(Mancini & Gangemi, 2011) or ‘consequentialist’ (Cushman & Greene, 2012) 
judgements.  
The dual process model (Greene et al., 2004) helps to understand the different 
parts of the literature and the conflicts between emotion and reason, deontology and 
utilitarianism. This model proposes that moral judgements require psychological 
systems involving both emotion and explicit reasoning. In this model, reasoning relies 
on two separate brain systems, with deontological moral judgements being ‘driven by 
automatic emotional processes’ in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPC), an 
area specific to moral judgements (Greene & Haidt, 2002) and social emotion 
(Damasio, Tranel & Damasio, 1990), and utilitarian moral judgements being ‘driven 
by controlled cognitive processes’, in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DPC). In line 
with this, it has been shown that emotions are important in raising an individual’s 
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awareness of moral dilemmas and help to make decisions in moral dilemmas 
(Horberg et al., 2011). 
In line with Freud’s (1976) early work, Greene et al.’s (2001) experimental 
study concluded that there are variations in the engagement of emotion in moral 
judgements and that these differences have a strong influence on moral judgements. 
The authors found more emotion to be involved in personal moral dilemmas and this 
led to more deontological judgements. This was based on the responses of nine 
participants responding to 60 dilemmas whilst being monitored by fMRI. This 
correlational study was supported by further empirical studies showing a causal 
relationship that a reduction in emotion lead to individuals making fewer 
deontological judgements, in moral dilemmas (Bechara, Tranel, Damasio & Damasio, 
1996; Koenigs et al., 2007). Whilst only based on six participants making decisions 
on 50 dilemmas, Koenigs et al. (2007) found that those with damage to the VMPC, 
which would imply a level of deterioration in emotional functioning, made fewer 
deontological judgements. The same results have been found in individuals with 
fronto-temporal dementia, who also often have fewer emotional experiences (Bechara 
et al., 1996). In fact, these individuals have been found to make more utilitarian 
judgements (Mendez, Anderson & Shapira, 2005), which is in support of the dual 
process model. Whilst encouraging evidence, it should be noted that it was not made 
clear whether damage to the VMPC could also have implications on other cognitive 
abilities of these individuals. This raises the possibility of other deficits being 
implicated and limits the generalisability of these results.   
The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DPC) has also been found to play a key 
role in decision-making in moral dilemmas (Greene & Haidt, 2002) and the theory 
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that cognitive processes in the DPC drives utilitarian moral judgements has been 
supported by neuroimaging studies. Greene et al. (2004) suggested an association 
between cognitive processes and utilitarian judgements, with more cognitive 
processes being associated with making more utilitarian judgements. Conversely, 
whilst it may have been expected that adding a cognitive task might prevent utilitarian 
judgements (Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom & Cohen, 2008), asking 
individuals to do a cognitive task whilst making a moral judgement has been found to 
slow down the speed at which utilitarian judgements can be made, whilst 
deontological judgements are not affected (Greene et al., 2008). This suggested a 
causal role for cognitive processes and provided further empirical support for the idea 
that utilitarian judgements require more cognitive engagement than deontological 
judgements. In other words, utilitarian judgements are more rational and less 
emotional than deontological ones.  
Specifically, Greene et al. (2008) argue that utilitarian judgements are more 
complex, involving both utilitarian and deontological elements. They suggested that 
moral dilemmas initially engage both emotional responses and controlled cognition 
but that utilitarian judgements involve more reasoning and the consideration of moral 
values. If an individual realises that an automatic emotional response transgresses 
moral norms, the need for cognitive control is highlighted and executive functions are 
employed (Greene et al., 2008). This is also supported by Manfrinati, Lotto, Sarlo, 
Palomba and Rumiati (2013) who presented participants with both deontological and 
utilitarian options to a moral dilemma and asked them to report on their emotional 
experiences whilst making their judgement. They found emotion to be involved in 
both deontological and utilitarian judgements.  
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It therefore seems possible that individual differences in using emotion or 
controlled cognition when making moral judgements contributes towards predicting 
the use of deontological/utilitarian reasoning. However we do not yet know whether 
or how this affects individuals who have differences in their emotional or cognitive 
processes, such as those with psychological disorders.  
1.3.2 Moral judgements in OCD. As previously stated, a judgement of 
responsibility for potential harm can be considered a moral judgment (Shaver, 1985 as 
cited in Pizarro, Ulmann & Bloom, 2003). Individuals with OCD have been shown to 
have higher senses of responsibility, and react to perceived issues of responsibility 
more readily than individuals without OCD. This raises the possibility that individuals 
with OCD may make moral judgements in a way that is different to those without 
OCD.  
Historically, individuals with OCD have been described as having a strong 
superego (Freud, 1926), referring to the ethical component of the mind that provides 
moral standards. Furthermore, the intrusive thoughts, doubts and images individuals 
with OCD experience are often ego-dystonic, that is, conflicting with their values and 
identity. When considering personality traits, research suggests that individuals with 
OCD have higher levels of perfectionism (Frost & Steketee, 1997), sensitivity to 
punishment and neuroticism (Fullana et al., 2004) and these characteristics raise the 
possibility of these individuals making moral judgements that are different to 
individuals without OCD, who do not score so highly in these areas.  Indeed, past 
research has often linked issues of morality to OCD. For example, Salkovskis (1989) 
suggested that individuals with OCD tend to be more sensitive to intrusions that 
contradict their moral beliefs; Bhar (2004 cited in Doron & Kyrios, 2005) found 
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individuals with OCD to hold more uncertain views about themselves, in regards to 
their morals, and Clark and Purdon (1993) suggested that vulnerable individuals 
might believe that their intrusive thoughts show elements of a ‘bad person’. More 
specifically, using self-report measures, higher levels of OCD symptomatology have 
been shown to be associated with a heightened awareness of moral dilemmas (Doron, 
Moulding, Kyrios & Nedeljkovic, 2008) and Abramowitz, Doron, Sar-El and 
Altenburger (2013) found that the intrusive thoughts of individuals with OCD were 
related to moral themes.  
Rachman (1997) emphasised that individuals with OCD often interpret their 
intrusions as having a significant personal meaning and having strong implications on 
their actions. In support of this is thought-action fusion (TAF), a cognitive bias 
commonly occurring in OCD (Shafran, Thordarson & Rachman, 1996) and known to 
increase distress and compulsive behaviours (Rachman, 1998). TAF results in 
individuals with OCD feeling that having an immoral thought is just as bad as acting 
in line with the immoral thought. Perhaps due to this, in comparison to those with 
other psychological disorders, individuals with OCD are less likely to see themselves 
as morally acceptable (Ferrier & Brewin, 2005) and this may go some way to 
explaining the link between OCD and individuals with OCD feeling additionally 
responsible for what they do.   
In spite of this research, the current understanding of the moral judgements of 
individuals with OCD is in relative infancy (Franklin et al., 2009) and there is little 
empirical research looking specifically at this area (Franklin et al., 2009), beyond the 
role of responsibility. Franklin et al. (2009) suggested that the heightened sense of 
responsibility associated with OCD might influence moral judgements. Whilst it was 
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not possible to determine causality from this study, they hypothesised that a 
heightened sense of responsibility would either be associated with the likelihood of 
individuals not acting to prevent harm and therefore preferring to permit the deaths of 
more people (deontological) or that it would be associated with individuals acting to 
harm and therefore saving the lives of many (utilitarian).  
Franklin et al. (2009) studied whether individuals with OCD, in comparison to 
those without OCD, tended to reason more by using deontological or utilitarian 
principles, when presented with moral dilemmas in the form of vignettes based on 
those used by Greene and Haidt (2002) and Greene et al. (2004). Each dilemma 
involved two options which participants were asked to choose from: acting according 
to the utilitarian principle of saving as many people as possible, but sacrificing a 
smaller number (utilitarian judgement) versus not choosing to sacrifice, even a small 
number, and permitting more deaths to occur (deontological judgement). They found 
both an increased sense of responsibility and increased OCD symptomatology to be 
associated with deontological judgements. Therefore, the stronger the sense of 
responsibility, the less likely participants were to choose to act to kill one person in 
order to save the lives of others. However, the findings did not show a difference in 
the number of deontological judgements made by the OCD group, in comparison to 
the non-clinical group. Higher Y-BOCS scores were associated with more 
deontological judgements, but again this effect was not statistically significant.  
Whilst this result showed no significant differences between the decision-
making processes of individuals with OCD, in comparison to those without OCD, it is 
possible that methodological limitations may account for this. Firstly, their sample 
was small (N=20 and N=18 in the OCD group and non-clinical groups respectively), 
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increasing the possibility of insufficient power and the chance of type II error. 
Secondly, they did not use OCD relevant vignettes. Wroe and Salkovskis (2000) 
showed that the moral judgements of individuals with OCD only differ from non-
clinical controls, in situations that activate their OCD concerns. This is important due 
to personally relevant situations being more associated to emotional responses 
(Greene et al., 2001) and deontological judgements (Koenigs et al., 2007). It is 
therefore possible that these individuals would make more deontological moral 
judgements in situations activating their OCD concerns. Thirdly, Franklin et al.’s 
vignettes detailed high-risk dilemmas. It is possible that extreme situations would 
elicit the same reaction in any individual and those with OCD are able to override 
their cognitive biases in extreme scenarios (Franklin et al., 2009). This suggestion was 
supported by Foa et al. (2003) who found no difference between individuals with 
OCD and those without in regards to the time taken to make a decision in a scenario 
that was more extreme, but those with OCD took significantly longer to make 
decisions when the risk was removed. Finally, it is possible that the decisions 
individuals make for imaginary scenarios differ from those they would make in real 
life decisions. Although the dilemmas were artificial, neurological imaging research 
shows that making judgements in hypothetical moral dilemmas, where the utilitarian 
option involves choosing to harm an individual to save the lives of multiple others, 
activates brain areas essential for emotional decision making (Greene et al., 2004).  
Spranca et al. (1991) found that non-clinical populations report themselves as 
feeling less responsible when they have not done anything (omission), as opposed to 
when they have acted and their actions have caused harm. The authors attributed this 
omission bias to perceived differences in the cause of harm, levels of responsibility 
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for this and the ‘bald fact that one situation is commission and one is omission’ 
(p.94). However, specific situations seem to cause individuals with OCD to react 
similarly for both omission and commission scenarios, showing the sensitivity they 
have to omissions. Wroe and Salkovskis (2000) proposed that this was due to the 
‘obsessional thinking’ of individuals with OCD, specifically their intrusions and 
responsibility assumptions.   
Wroe and Salkovskis (2000) investigated biases in OCD, looking at the action 
principle, which states that harm resulting from action is less acceptable than harm 
resulting from inaction (Baron & Ritov, 1999). Although still using self-report of 
feelings about action, rather than self-report of action or making direct behavioural 
observations, they presented vignettes depicting dilemmas and compared the 
responses of individuals with OCD (N=42), other anxiety disorders (N=25) and non-
clinical groups (N=52). In contrast to other groups, the individuals with OCD applied 
the principle differently, judging action and inaction as equally bad, in situations that 
activated their OCD concerns. This showed that there was no difference in moral 
judgements per se, rather a difference when OCD concerns are activated. Wroe and 
Salkovskis (2000) hypothesised that heightened sense of responsibility moderated the 
relationship between intrusive thoughts and moral judgements, in turn driving 
compulsive behaviours. This has not yet been tested but it is possible that it is linked 
to the significance of personal relevance. This evidence heightens the possibility that 
there may be differences between the ways in which individuals with and without 
OCD make moral judgements, in certain scenarios, and raises the possibility that this 
may be related to differences in deontological versus utilitarian reasoning.  
Looking at this in more detail, Mancini (2001; cited in Mancini & Gangemi, 
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2004) suggested that compulsive behaviours are triggered by a fear of not acting in a 
way that is deemed to be morally correct. In other words, it would not be correct to 
not try to prevent a feared event from happening. In non-clinical participants, 
Gangemi and Mancini (2013) found individuals who chose not to act in a moral 
dilemma tended to use the feeling of deontological guilt as a justification; for 
example, saying ‘who am I to decide who lives and who dies?!’. In contrast, those 
who chose to act tended to justify it with the altruistic consequences; for example, 
saying ‘it is better than one person dies instead of five’ (p. 2975). Mancini, D’Olimpio 
and Cieri (2004) proposed that Salkovskis and Forrester’s (2002) work needed 
refinement and suggested that a responsible person is not one who thinks their 
behaviours may cause harm, but one who takes responsibility for them. In agreement 
with this, Dettore (2003; cited in Mancini & Gangemi, 2011) found that individuals 
with OCD are less concerned about other people, or their wellbeing, but feel highly 
responsible for their own actions and the consequences of these. 
Refining their theory, Mancini (2008 cited in Gangemi & Mancini, 2011) 
proposed the existence of two different types of guilt a) altruistic guilt that drives 
individuals to make decisions for the best outcome for others and b) deontological 
guilt that drives individuals to make decisions on the basis of their own moral norms, 
such as 'you shouldn't kill an innocent baby'. In support of their distinction, these 
types of guilt appear to be associated with different areas of the brain: altruistic guilt 
involves the insulae and the anterior cingulate cortex, and deontological guilt involves 
the medial prefrontal areas (Basile et al., 2011). 
Mancini and Gangemi (2015) studied the moral judgements of 60 individuals 
(20 OCD; 20 anxious controls and 20 non-clinical) using seven scenarios detailing 
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moral dilemmas, similar to those used in Greene et al. (2004), that required 
participants to choose from deontological or utilitarian outcomes.  They found 
individuals with OCD to be less likely to choose to act, in order to prevent harm to an 
individual, driven by deontological guilt (they do nothing because it is wrong to kill 
someone). This finding was greater in individuals with OCD than anxious controls 
and individuals without anxiety. In support of this, deontological guilt has been 
shown to activate doubting, discomfort, checking and washing behaviours to a greater 
extent than altruistic guilt and deontological guilt has been shown to play a role in the 
development and maintenance of OCD (D’Olimpio & Mancini, 2014). It should be 
noted however that much of Mancini’s team’s work so far has also been limited to 
small populations in specific regions in Italy that are strongly catholic and they 
highlight how guilt is used as a motivator in education systems there (D’Olimpio & 
Mancini, 2014). It is therefore possible that their participants were more sensitive to 
guilt and studies would benefit from replication in other populations to aid 
generalisation. It should also be noted that, similarly to the research of Franklin et al. 
(2009) and Greene et al. (2001; 2004; 2008) the scenarios studied always involved 
omission bias (to act or do nothing). In fact, some authors describe it to have become 
‘systematised’ into deontological theory (Greene & Baron, 2001). 
Nevertheless, this provides further evidence for the fact that individuals with 
OCD may make moral judgements in a different way to individuals without OCD. 
Specifically, it suggests that those with OCD are especially concerned about the 
possibility of transgressing a moral norm.  It also highlights the importance of the role 
of emotion in moral judgements.  
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1.4 The role of emotion 
Emotions can be seen as ‘response systems’ that are made up of expression, 
physiological changes and subjective feelings (Watson & Clark, 1994). They are a 
common part of human nature because the world is full of new events for us to 
interpret (Mandler, 1979). Emotion is known to interfere with rationality (Mandler, 
1979) and this may be in part attributed to the fact that it is personal in nature, 
triggered in response to personal appraisals (Horberg, Oveis & Keltner, 2011). 
1.4.1 The role of emotion in moral judgements. Emotions are important in 
helping individuals to interact with their environments (Carni, Petrocchi, Del Miglie, 
Mancini & Couyoumdjian, 2013). In particular, they can help draw attention to 
pertinent issues, particularly discrepancies (Dewey, 1894), and make sense of social 
interaction (Damasio, 1994). Following this, emotion can be key in initiating 
appropriate action (Carni et al., 2013).  
It has been argued that emotions are specifically implicated in highlighting 
moral dilemmas (Horberg et al., 2011). For example, these authors draw attention to 
research showing ‘gut feelings’ to support us decide whether or not to help someone 
(Batson & Shaw, 1991), decide on appropriate punishments for doing something 
morally wrong (Graham, Weiner & Zucker, 1997) and how to allocate resources 
between people (Batson, Klein, Highberget & Shaw, 1995). More specifically, 
different emotions can be implicated in different moral dilemmas. For example, 
Horberg et al. (2011) also highlighted that moral issues relating to impurity have been 
found to be associated with feelings of disgust (Haidt & Graham, 2007), issues with 
fairness have been linked to feelings of anger (Horberg, Oveis, Keltner & Cohen, 
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2009), and lack of respect for duties has been linked to feelings of worthlessness 
(Rozin, Lowery, Imada & Haidt, 1999). Furthermore, guilt has been found to be 
associated with acting in ways that are not in line with one’s moral values 
(Baumeister, Stillwell & Heatherton, 1994). As a result of this, emotions have been 
proposed to be the mechanism by which moral dilemmas are raised (Horberg et al., 
2011) and appraisals are activated, determining the impact emotion has on moral 
judgements.  
Indeed, Greene et al. (2001) suggested that heightened emotion is important in 
influencing people’s moral judgements. As noted above, they found different moral 
dilemmas to induce emotional processing to a greater or lesser extent and this had an 
impact on the judgements that people made. Whilst it would benefit from replication 
in larger samples, their work supports the role of emotion in morality in showing that 
emotional processes were predominantly activated when individuals made 
judgements about personal moral scenarios. Other empirical studies with larger 
samples (N=108) have also found significant emotional reactions as a result of being 
presented with the possibility of harming others (Cushman, Gray, Gaffey & Mendes, 
2012).  
Emotion has also been found to influence the type of judgements people make. 
Szekely and Miu (2015) found negative emotion to initiate moral disapproval and 
result in more deontological judgements. This is in support of Tassy et al. (2012) who 
found a relationship between the level of emotion individuals experienced and the 
chances of them making deontological moral judgements, with more emotion being 
associated with more deontological moral judgements. It is important to bear in mind 
that it is not clear whether these emotions were associated with deontological 
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decisions because participants wanted to avoid choosing the opposite course of action 
(Mellers & McGraw, 2001), which happened to be utilitarian, or whether 
deontological and utilitarian options are opposite ends of a continuum (Conway & 
Gawronski, 2013); despite research in the area assuming that the latter is the case.  
1.4.2 Moral emotions in OCD. Amongst the literature on the association 
between emotion and moral judgements, certain emotions have been labelled as 
‘moral emotions’. One such emotion is disgust (Miller, 1997 as cited in Basile et al., 
2011) with evidence suggesting that more disgust correlates with increased sensitivity 
to moral dilemmas and more discomfort when hearing about moral transgressions  
(Jones & Fitness, 2008). In recent years, interest has been growing in the role of 
emotion in psychological disorders (Edwards, Jackson & Pattison, 2002) and disgust 
has been implicated as a specific emotion in OCD, with OCD symptomatology, 
particularly contamination fears, being associated with increased feelings of the 
emotion (Olatunji, Ebesutani & David, 2011), even when anxiety (Mancini, Gragnani 
& D’Olimpio, 2001) and low mood (Olatunji et al., 2007) is accounted for.  This 
finding has been further supported by neuroimaging studies, which clearly showed 
specific brain regions to be involved in the processing of disgust, and Husted, 
Shapiria and Goodman (2006) suggested that it may be relevant to contamination-
based OCD. It is possible that individuals with OCD find disgust more difficult to 
tolerate than individuals without OCD due to heightened sensitivity to the emotion 
(Olatunji, 2010). 
If disgust is associated with increased sensitivity to moral dilemmas and is 
elevated in those with OCD then it is possible that this contributes to the way in 
which individuals with OCD make moral judgements. Basile, Mancini, Macaluso, 
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Caltagirone and Bozzali (2013) studied disgust in some detail and described it as 
having a basic component of guilt, helping to clarify the relationship between these 
emotions. This is supported by literature suggesting disgust to be a primary emotion 
(Griffiths, 2003) and guilt to be a more complex emotion (Ekman, 1999) and the 
finding that the two emotions activate the same brain region (D’Olimpio & Mancini, 
2014). This helps to understand Haidt and Hersh’s (2001) finding, that individuals 
commonly experience guilt, after transgressing moral rules. Indeed, guilt has also 
been linked to the development of moral values (Eisenberg, 2000) and Haidt (2003) 
proposed that it could activate strong feelings of morality. 
Lopatka and Rachman (1995) further proposed a link between guilt and 
responsibility and this begins to highlight the breath of processes involved in moral 
judgements, specifically the links between disgust, guilt and responsibility and the 
role of these emotions in OCD. Guilt has also been specifically linked to symptoms of 
OCD (Freeston et al., 1993) and Mancini, Gangemi, Perdighe and Marini (2008) 
further specified that the link between responsibility and guilt is due to concern 
around having violated a moral norm. Supporting this, D’Olimpio and Mancnin 
showed the induction of deontological guilt (i.e., feeling guilty as a result of 
transgressing a moral norm) to have similar effects to the induction of responsibility 
in individuals with OCD, leading to an increase in compulsive behaviours.  
It seems therefore that emotion, in particular guilt/disgust, and responsibility 
may be strongly implicated in the way in which individuals with OCD make moral 
judgements, and that this is different from the way in which individuals without OCD 
make their judgements. Furthermore, it is possible that the effects of these emotions 
may be even stronger when participants are involved in moral actions, rather than 
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making a more removed hypothetical judgement of moral acceptability. Not only has 
recent interest been growing in the role of emotion in psychological disorders, but 
imagery has also become a focus of interest. In fact, Holmes and Mathews (2005) 
highlight the strong link between these two areas, showing emotional salience to 
increase with the presence of imagery.  
1.5 Imagery 
Mental imagery is defined as the voluntary or involuntary ‘simulation or re-creation 
of perceptual experience across sensory modalities’ (Kosslyn, Ganis & Thompson, 
2001 cited in Pearson Naselaris, Holmes & Kosslyn, 2015; p3). Imagery has been a 
key factor in research on the brain over many years (Pearson et al., 2015) and is 
claimed to be one of the most important psychological factors supporting memory, 
planning and decision-making (Pearson et al., 2015). Furthermore, mental imagery is 
a significant factor in the presentation of many mental health disorders and has an 
increasingly important role in their treatment (Pearson et al., 2015). 
1.5.1 Imagery and moral judgements. Of crucial significance, the presence 
of imagery has been shown to be associated with individuals making deontological 
moral judgements (Amit & Greene, 2012). Amit and Greene (2012) hypothesised that 
deontological moral judgements are supported by visual imagery and that verbal 
processes support utilitarian judgements. This was based on the finding that visual 
representations are more emotionally salient (Holmes & Mathews, 2005), than verbal 
thought (Mathews, Ridgeway & Holmes, 2013), due to the earlier evolution of 
emotion (O’hman & Mineka, 2001).  
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Using a visual/verbal task to assess the preferential cognitive style of their 
participants (N=51), they found that individuals with visual cognitive styles made 
more deontological than utilitarian moral judgements. This occurred when they were 
asked to comment on what they would do in seven moral dilemmas, presented in the 
form of vignettes. Using another experiment to investigate the mechanism of this 
effect and asking participants to make self-reports on the contents of their visual 
imagery, Amit and Greene (2012) explained that this was because participants 
(N=370) visualised the action rather than the overall outcome. The visualisation also 
triggered the emotional responses that support deontological judgements.  
In order to explain this further, Amit and Greene (2012) drew on construal 
level theory (Trope & Liberman, 2010) which states that individuals’ visual 
representations can occur on different levels. The theory explains high-level 
construals to be abstract, representing the overall outcome and low-level construals to 
be more explicit, showing the ways in which the overall goals are attained. Amit, 
Algom, Trope and Liberman (2009) found that visual representations facilitate low-
level construals and verbal representations facilitate high level construals, so high-
level construals can be seen to have similar qualities to utilitarian judgements and 
low-level construals can be seen to have similar qualities to deontological 
judgements. These findings suggest a link between the dual-process theory (Greene et 
al., 2001) and construal level theory (Amit & Greene, 2012) and implicates the role of 
visual imagery in moral judgements.  
Related to this, mental imagery has been found to play a pivotal role in many 
mental health conditions and their treatments. Intrusive mental imagery causes 
distress across a range of psychological disorders from anxiety disorders such as post-
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traumatic stress disorder and phobias to schizophrenia and personality disorders 
(Holmes & Matthews, 2010) however, it is only recently that research has begun to 
look at the effect of images on emotion.  
In 2005, Holmes and Matthews found that mental imagery led to more intense 
emotion than verbal processing. They gave participants scenarios with directions that 
lead to either mental imagery or verbal processing and found that those in the mental 
imagery group experienced a greater increase in anxiety than the verbal processing 
group. Intense emotion was also found as a result of scenarios that were both negative 
and positive in nature (Holmes, Mathews, Dalgleish & Mackintosh, 2006). This set of 
research studies was in support of Arntz, de Groot and Kindt (2005), who found 
emotional memories to have more sensory features than memories that did not evoke 
such strong emotion. Both findings support the work of Amit and Greene (2012).  
Some other properties of imagery also have important implications for this 
work. Many individuals describe their mental imagery as feeling real, in spite of the 
knowledge that this is not the case (Pearson et al., 2015). This is especially true when 
compared with verbal thoughts and imagery has been found to have more of an 
impact on the actions of individuals (Holmes & Matthews, 2010; Pearson et al., 
2015). Given that individuals with OCD often experience distressing images (De 
Silva, 1986), and at a greater frequency in OCD than in other anxiety disorders 
(Lipton, Brewin, Linke & Halperin, 2010) it is possible that this effect found by Amit 
and Greene (2012) may be amplified in these populations.  
As Amit and Greene (2012) found individuals to imagine the potential harm 
caused by an action more when making deontological judgements, it is possible that 
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imagery mediates the relationship between OCD and deontological judgements, 
adding an alternative theory to that of responsibility in the triggering of compulsive 
behaviours and maintenance of OCD. This possibility is supported by Caruso and 
Gino (2011), who found that closing ones eyes can affect moral judgements. They 
explained that the increased imagination of the scenario as well as the increased levels 
of emotion felt when closing one’s eyes could affect judgements made. They 
highlighted the possibility that closing one’s eyes may just enable individuals to focus 
more (Caruso & Gino, 2011), as opposed to having an effect on the vividness of the 
image but, in light of other evidence, this seems unlikely.  
Individuals with OCD experience more visual images than those without 
OCD. Those relevant to their OCD concerns may produce strong emotional reactions. 
This coupled with the image of harm and potential difficulties in cognitive control 
(Whitton, Henry & Grisham, 2014) means that individuals with OCD may find it 
difficult to control strong emotions, engage in more logical thinking and focus on the 
more abstract and distant outcome overall. 
1.6 Summary 
Individuals with OCD are a heterogeneous group and the complexities of the 
mechanisms causing compulsive behaviours are in the process of being further 
understood. Research has demonstrated that individuals with OCD often have 
heightened levels of responsibility (Salkovskis et al., 2000), and this can lead to them 
engaging in compulsive behaviours, designed to prevent harm from occurring. 
Research also suggests that individuals with OCD, interpret moral dilemmas 
differently from those without OCD, feeling that not acting and causing harm is as 
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bad as acting and causing harm, in situations relevant to their idiosyncratic OCD 
concerns. Individuals with OCD also use other types of reasoning to make moral 
judgements. For example, research has shown people with OCD to make more 
decisions based on individual rights, rather than the greater good (Franklin et al., 
2009; Mancini & Gangemi, 2015).  
Having an image in mind leads to differences in the use of controlled 
cognition or emotional processing in decision making in moral dilemmas and this in 
turn leads to different judgements being made (Amit & Greene, 2012). It is unclear 
whether this is also the case for individuals with OCD, who have differences in their 
cognitive and emotional processing. Individuals with OCD are often concerned about 
transgressing moral norms (Mancini, 2001 cited in Mancini & Gangemi, 2004) and 
experience frequent and distressing intrusive images, which may produce strong 
emotional reactions when particularly relevant to them. This raises the possibility that 
individuals with OCD may also engage in different processes when making moral 
judgements, specifically being more influenced by imagery and emotional processing.     
1.7 The Present Study 
1.7.1 Aims. This study aimed to investigate the moral judgements individuals 
with OCD make and the mechanisms leading to these judgements. Specifically, the 
study aimed to investigate the possible association between symptoms of OCD and 
deontological moral judgements and explore whether individuals with OCD make 
more deontological judgements than individuals without the disorder. It also aimed to 
explore the impact of the presence of imagery on these judgements. 
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1.7.2 Hypotheses. 
Hypothesis One. OCD symptomatology will be associated with deontological 
judgements.  
Hypothesis Two. People with OCD will make more deontological than 
utilitarian judgements, in comparison to those without OCD.  
Hypothesis Three. Imagery will mediate the relationship between OCD and 
moral judgements. 
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2. Method 
This chapter begins with a description of the participants who completed the study. It 
then describes the recruitment strategy, materials used and the full procedure for 
conducting the study. It also discusses ethical considerations and provides information 
on the study development and piloting process.  
2.1 Participants 
One hundred and forty five participants (120 females, 23 males, one participant chose 
not to disclose this information and one stated ‘other’) were recruited online (full 
details of recruitment are provided in section 2.2). They completed the study between 
October 2015 and March 2016. The mean age of participants was 27.86 years 
(SD=12.13), and the range was 17 to 70 years.  
 2.1.1 OCD group. Research has demonstrated that a score of 21 or higher on 
the Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory-Revised (OCI-R) is an indicator of the presence 
of OCD (Foa et al., 2002). Research also suggests that a score of 16 or higher on the 
Yale-Brown Obsessive-Compulsive Scale-Self-Report (Y-BOCS-SR) is consistent 
with a diagnosis of OCD. Criteria for the OCD group was therefore a score of 21 or 
higher on the OCI-R and a score of 16 or higher on the Y-BOCS-SR. Participants 
scoring above the cut-off on one of the OCD measures, but not on the other were not 
included in the OCD group. Thirty participants, who completed the study, met these 
criteria (25 female, 4 males, one participant stated ‘other’). The mean age of the OCD 
group was 27.93 (SD=11.19).  
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 2.1.2 Comparison group. Previous studies have set arbitrary cut-offs to 
identify a group of individuals for non-OCD comparison groups (e.g., Jones & 
Bhattacharya, 2014). In order to obtain a comparison group of a similar size to that of 
the OCD group a sample was selected based on the lowest 18% of scores on the OCI-
R and Y-BOCS-SR. This enabled comparisons between the individuals who scored 
highest on the OCI-R and Y-BOCS-SR (from now on, this is referred to as the OCD 
group); and those who scored lowest on these measures (this group is referred to as 
the comparison group). Following this procedure, inclusion for the comparison group 
comprised of scoring lower than 13 on the OCI-R and lower than 7 on the Y-BOCS-
SR. Twenty-seven participants, who completed the study, met these criteria (21 
females, 6 males). The mean age of the comparison group was 30.93 (SD=12.17). 
Further demographic information, including information on representativeness, is 
provided in the Results chapter.    
2.2 Recruitment 
2.2.1 Recruitment process. Participants were recruited via the social media 
forums Facebook and Twitter, the Royal Holloway, University of London (RHUL) 
Undergraduate Psychology Participation Scheme and OCD charities including OCD 
Action, OCD Ireland and the International OCD Foundation (see appendix C for an 
example advert). Participants were self-selected, meaning that they were invited to 
take part if they wished to. All recruitment methods gave a brief outline of the study 
as well as an Internet link leading to further information and the study itself. All 
participants were informed that taking part in the study was voluntary and that they 
could withdraw at any time, without this having any adverse consequences. It was 
emphasised that any student participant could withdraw at any time without those 
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actions affecting their academic studies.  Participants were also informed that the 
study would be completely confidential and they were invited to contact the 
researcher and supervisors with any questions. Participants were then given the 
opportunity to provide their consent to take part. The study took place online, via the 
research platform Qualtrics (Provo, UT, 2015), and any Internet enabled device could 
be used to complete it. Participants therefore took part in the study independently, at a 
time and location of their choice. 
 2.2.2 Inclusion/Exclusion criteria. Participants whose level of English was 
not sufficient to complete the study, as well as those who were unable to complete an 
online questionnaire for any reason and those who had a diagnosis of psychosis, as 
determined by self-report on the demographic questionnaire, were excluded from the 
study. One participant, who self-reported a diagnosis of psychosis, was consequently 
excluded from the analysis.  
2.2.3 Power analysis. The number of participants required for the current 
study was calculated using an a priori power analysis. The calculation was based on 
Franklin et al. (2009) who investigated moral judgements in OCD using a similar 
methodology to that employed in the current study. Although the effect was not 
statistically significant, they found OCD symptom severity to be inversely related to 
choosing to act according to utilitarian principles, with a medium effect size (r(18)= -
.32, p=.18). The power analysis for this study was therefore calculated based on the 
assumption that it would obtain medium effect sizes. 
In order to obtain a power level of .80 and α of .05, the recommended sample 
size for a correlational analysis is 85 (Cohen, 1992). It was therefore decided that a 
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minimum of 85 participants would be required. This was based on the primary 
hypothesis, Hypothesis One, which investigated whether OCD symptomatology 
would correlate with deontological moral judgements. The number of participants in 
the study (N=145) met these criteria and lead to an actual power level .78 based on a 
correlational analysis, with alpha set to 0.05. Recruitment was not stopped at the 
target number of 85 participants required for a correlational analysis (Hypothesis 
One) due to the lack of participants meeting criteria for the OCD group when the 
target of 85 was met and the importance of stopping recruitment from the online sites 
aimed at the OCD and non-OCD comparison groups at the same time.  
2.2.4 Sample attrition. Two hundred and sixty nine participants began 
completing the study. Of these participants, 146 completed all of the questionnaires. 
One hundred and twenty three participants withdrew from the study once they had 
started making the attrition rate 45.72%. As one participant met criteria for exclusion 
from the study, the overall percentage of those participants not used in the analyses 
was 46.09%. Therefore, the participants in the study (N=145) represented 53.90% of 
the original 269 beginning the study. The attrition rate is shown in more detail in the 
flow chart below (Figure 2.1). Possible implications of this large attrition rate are 
discussed further in the Discussion chapter.  
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Figure 2.1 Sample attrition 
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2.3 Materials and Measures 
2.3.1 Socio-demographic information. A demographic questionnaire 
(appendix E) was designed to gather information about the participants’ socio-
demographic characteristics. This was a self-report questionnaire, which participants 
completed at the beginning of the study. It asked for information including gender, 
ethnicity, marital status, employment status, highest level of education and religion. 
Participants were also asked about any current or previous diagnoses of OCD, 
whether or not they have received any psychological treatment for this and whether 
they took any medication for anxiety. Finally, participants were asked whether they 
had ever had any other diagnoses of mental health conditions. Participants who 
answered ‘yes’ were invited to give further detail.  
2.3.2 Measures of imagery. Measures of imagery were considered in order to 
select the measure that was most appropriate for this research. Previous research that 
has shown a relationship between moral judgements and imagery (Amit & Greene, 
2012) used a computerised task to measure the preferential cognitive style of their 
participants. It was not possible to use the same task due to the time involved for 
participants to complete this offline, and the potential impact of this on recruitment. 
Therefore, a self-report measure of the same constructs was selected for use in the 
current study. As this part of the study was novel and exploratory in nature, a measure 
of trait imagery was also selected, as a measure of general imagery use. These 
measures are described below.   
Verbaliser-Visualiser Questionnaire – Revised (VVQ-R). The VVQ-R 
(Kirby, Moore & Schofield, 1988; see appendix G) is a 20-item self-report measure of 
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verbal/visual cognitive style in everyday scenarios. It is used to measure whether 
participants’ cognitive style is more visual or verbal and was chosen for use in the 
current study as the most commonly used self-report measure for determining 
visual/verbal cognitive style (Antonietti & Giorgetti, 1998). The VVQ-R includes ten 
statements that relate to a verbal cognitive style for example ‘I enjoy doing work that 
requires the use of words’ and ten that relate to a visual cognitive style, for example 
‘The old saying ‘a picture is worth a thousand words’ is certainly true for me’. There 
are also ten optional questions that assess a third cognitive style termed ‘dream 
vividness’. As this factor has been confirmed to be independent of the scale and 
analyses justify the use of the 20-item scale (Kirby et al. 1988) it was not included in 
the current study.  
Participants are asked to read the statements and mark them as ‘true’ or 
‘false’. Responses are summed, taking into account positively and negatively phrased 
statements, within each dimension. So as not to create false categorisation the author 
did not create cut off scores. Rather, they advised that scales should be used as 
continuous variables (Kirby, personal communication, January 9, 2015) with lower 
Visual/Verbal scores indicating the tendency the individual has towards that cognitive 
style. 
The VVQ-R is a well-established measure, which has been shown to have 
good construct validity and adequate reliability (α=.70 and .59 respectively; Kirby et 
al., 1988) although, to the author’s knowledge, it has not been used specifically with 
OCD samples. Kirby et al., (1988) showed that scores in the visual and verbal 
dimensions of the VVQ-R correlate with objective measures of visual and verbal 
abilities respectively, as measured by well known cognitive tests (ACER Higher Test, 
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Form ML; Australian Council for Educational Research, 1981 and The Card 
Rotations test and the Surface Development test of the Kit of Factor-References 
Cognitive Tests; Ekstrom, French, Harman & Derman, 1976). Furthermore, Kraemer, 
Rosenberg and Thompson-Schill, (2009) found that cognitive style, as defined by 
scores on the VVQ-R, correlates with physiological activity in visual and verbal brain 
regions.  
 Spontaneous Use of Imagery Scale (SUIS). The SUIS (Reisberg, Pearson & 
Kosslyn, 2003; see appendix I) is a self-report scale commonly used to measure 
participants’ use of visual imagery (e.g., Hales, Deeprose, Goodwin & Holmes, 2011; 
Holmes, Mathews, Mackintosh & Dalgleish, 2008; Holmes, Coughtrey & Connor, 
2008). It is a 12-item questionnaire that measures an individual’s spontaneous use of 
visual, non-emotional, imagery in everyday life. Participants are given descriptions of 
situations in which images are involved such as ‘When I think about visiting a 
relative, I almost always have a clear mental picture of him or her’. They are asked to 
indicate how much, on a likert scale of 1-5, each is appropriate for them (1 represents 
‘never appropriate’, 3 represents ‘appropriate about half of the time’ and 5 represents 
‘completely appropriate’). A total score is calculated by adding the total of the 12 
item scores, resulting in a total score ranging from 12 to 60. Higher scores indicate 
more use of imagery (Nelis, Holmes, Griffith & Raes, 2014).  
The author suggested the SUIS to have high internal consistency (correlations 
of at least .98) (Reisberg et al., 2003) and this was confirmed by McCarthy-Jones, 
Knowles and Rowse (2012) who reported an internal consistency of α = .83. A Dutch 
translation of the measure has been shown to have acceptable reliability (Chronbach’s 
alpha of .72) and convergent validity (Nelis et al., 2014). Furthermore, a clear 
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relationship has been found between the SUIS and the Vividness of Visual Imagery 
Questionnaire (Marks, 1973) suggesting that the two measures assess a related 
construct (Reisberg et al., 2003).  
2.3.3 Measures of OCD. As the study used an online methodology to increase 
access, and to ensure the same methods of data collection were employed for the two 
groups, it was not possible to use a clinician lead diagnostic tool such as the 
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM Disorders (SCID) (First, Spitzer, Gibbon & 
Williams, 1996). Limitations of this approach will be considered in the Discussion 
chapter. In the absence of a diagnostic interview, and following recommendations in 
the literature (Anholt et al., 2009), two self-report measures of obsessive compulsive 
symptoms were used and groups were selected according to them meeting cut-offs on 
both of these measures. The OCI-R (Foa et al., 2002) is a tool that has been shown to 
have good diagnostic ability (Abramowitz & Deacon, 2006) and the Y-BOCS-SR 
(Baer, 1991) has been shown to have particular strengths in assessing symptom 
severity (Steketee, Frost & Bogart, 1996). For these reasons, both were used in the 
current study.  
 Obsessive Compulsive Inventory – Revised (OCI-R). The OCI-R (Foa et al., 
2002; see appendix H) is an 18 item self-report questionnaire that assesses for the 
broad range of symptoms common in OCD, including obsessions and compulsions. 
Participants are given statements and are asked to rate, on a scale of 0 to 4, how much 
that experience has distressed or bothered them during the past month (zero represents 
‘not at all’, 2 represents ‘moderately’ and 4 represents ‘extremely’). Total scores are 
calculated by adding the item scores, with the possible range of scores being 0-72. 
The mean score for an individual with OCD is 28 (SD = 13.53) and a score of 21 or 
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more has been shown to be an indicator of the presence of OCD (Foa et al., 2002). 
The OCI-R has been found to be a good measure to discriminate OCD from other 
anxiety disorders (Abramowitz & Deacon, 2006) and has been used to distinguish 
between OCD and comparison groups in the literature (Jones & Bhattacharya, 2014). 
The scale has also been recommended for making diagnostic decisions (Grabill et al., 
2008) and has also been used in various languages and cultural contexts (Overduin & 
Furnham, 2012).  
 Foa et al. (2002) reported the scale to have good internal consistency with 
alphas ranging between 0.81 and 0.93. Similar alphas were reported by Abramowitz 
and Deacon (2006) and Hajcak, Huppert, Simons and Foa (2004). Foa et al. (2002) 
found the scale to have good test-retest reliability among individuals with OCD (r = 
.74 to .91) and for non-anxious controls (r = .57 to .87). The OCI-R has good 
construct validity (Foa et al., 2002) with total scores correlating with the Yale-Brown 
Obsessive-Compulsive Scale (Y-BOCS) (Goodman et al., 1989; r = .53), the 
Maudsley Obsessive Compulsive Inventory (Hodgson & Rachman, 1977; r = .85) and 
the National Institute of Mental Health Global Obsessive-Compulsive Scale (Insel et 
al., 1983; r = .66) for clinical and non-clinical individuals.    
Yale-Brown Obsessive-Compulsive Scale - Self-Report (Y-BOCS-SR). The 
Y-BOCS-SR (Baer, 1991; see appendix J) is a 68 item self-report questionnaire, 
adapted from the clinician-administered Y-BOCS (Goodman et al., 1989). The Y-
BOCS-SR consists of a 58 item symptom checklist, which divides up symptoms of 
OCD into categories including aggressive obsessions, contamination obsessions, 
sexual obsessions, hoarding/saving obsessions, religious obsessions, obsession with 
the need for symmetry or exactness, miscellaneous obsessions, somatic obsessions, 
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cleaning/washing compulsions, checking compulsions, repeating rituals, counting 
compulsions, ordering/arranging compulsions, hoarding/collecting compulsions and 
miscellaneous compulsions. The Y-BOCS-SR assesses the type of symptoms in OCD 
(Gonner, Ecker & Leonhart, 2009) as well as measuring the severity of these and 
facilitating diagnostic decisions (Grabill et al., 2008). Indeed, it has been used in this 
way in previous studies in the literature (Marques et al., 2010).  
Participants are asked to indicate whether the 58 obsessions and compulsions 
listed affect them, in order to help them to answer the next set of 10 questions. It then 
asks participants to rate, on a 5-point likert scale (where 0 = ‘none’ and 4 = 
‘extreme’), how distressing and impairing any thoughts and compulsions are. Scores 
are summed for the 10 questions in the second part of the Y-BOCS-SR questionnaire. 
A score of 16 or more indicates moderate symptoms of OCD and is a recommended 
cut-off score (Steketee et al.,1996). The Y-BOCS-SR has good internal consistency (α 
= .90 in a non-clinical sample and .79 in a clinical sample; Steketee et al., 1996), test-
retest reliability is excellent (.88 in a non-clinical sample as unfortunately there is no 
reported data available from clinical samples) and correlations (r=.75 in non-clinical 
sample, .79 in a clinical sample) with the clinician rated version show good 
convergent validity (Steketee et al., 1996).  
2.3.4 Measure of mood. A measure of mood was also selected for use in the 
study due to the previous association found between depression and deontological 
moral judgements (Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2006).  
 Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS). The HADS (Zigmond & 
Snaith, 1983; see appendix F) is a 14 item self-report questionnaire that identifies 
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clinical levels of anxiety disorders and depression through the use of two subscales 
(HADS-A and HADS-D respectively), both of which are internally consistent 
(HADS-A α = .76 (Martin & Thompson, 2000) - .93 (Moorey et al., 1991); HADS-D 
α= .72 (Martin & Thompson, 2000) -.90 (Moorey et al,. 1991)). It has been used in 
previous studies specifically looking at reasoning biases in OCD (e.g., Jacobsen, 
Freeman & Salkovskis, 2012) as well as numerous other studies that use OCD 
samples (e.g., Faull, Joseph, Meaden & Lawrence, 2004; Snorrason, Smari & 
Olafsson, 2011; Ryan, 2004). The items of the HADS are rated on a 4-point likert 
scale from 0-3. The totals from each subscale (depression and anxiety) are then 
calculated, with a maximum score of 21 on each. A score of 11 or above on a subscale 
indicates caseness for a mood or anxiety disorder (Zigmond & Snaith, 1994).  
 There is evidence to show that the HADS is a good measure to assess for the 
presence and severity of anxiety disorders and depression in both clinical and non-
clinical populations (Bjelland, Dahl, Haug & Neckelmann, 2002). Bjelland et al. 
(2002) conducted a review of 747 studies that used the HADS and found it to perform 
as well as other measures that assess for symptoms of depression and anxiety. 
Specifically, the HADS and the Beck depression inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward, 
Mendelson, Mock & Erbaugh, 1961) had a correlation of r = 0.73 and they found 
correlations of r = 0.68 to 0.71 with the State-Trait Assessment Inventory (STAI; 
Speilberger, 1983). The concurrent validity of the scale was therefore rated as ‘good 
to very good’ (Bjelland et al., 2002). Furthermore, the HADS has been validated for 
use with a range of ages and can be used in a variety of settings (Snaith, 2003).  
 2.3.5 Vignettes. The methodology used in studies investigating moral 
reasoning typically involves the presentation of vignettes depicting moral dilemmas 
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and asking participants to answer questions on these. The number of vignettes ranges 
across studies from four (Moulding, Kyrios & Doron, 2007) to forty (Greene et al., 
2008).  
 In line with other studies using a similar number of vignettes (e.g., Amit & 
Greene, 2012) as well as following feedback from piloting the measures, it was 
decided that six vignettes would be included in the current study (see appendix K). As 
the study was seeking to evaluate deontological/utilitarian constructs used in previous 
research (e.g., Amit & Greene, 2012; Franklin et al., 2009; Mancini & Gangemi, 
2015) it was deemed important to use the same vignettes as those studies. All of these 
used vignettes the same as or based on those in Greene et al. (2001) and Greene et al. 
(2004). 
 Therefore, in the current study three vignettes were selected from those used 
in Greene et al. (2001; 2004), which have been widely validated within non-clinical 
samples and have been shown to be related to imagery (Amit & Greene, 2012), and 
three were selected from Mancini and Gangemi (2015), which have been validated 
with OCD samples and used to find significant differences in the moral judgements of 
an OCD and comparison group (Mancini & Gangemi, 2015). The three vignettes used 
from Mancini and Gangemi (2015) were chosen from a possible four at random. This 
was deemed to be acceptable as they had all been validated as measuring the same 
constructs and, furthermore, there had been no significant differences between these 
vignettes in previous studies (Gangemi, personal communication, October 24, 2015). 
The three vignettes selected from Greene et al. (2001; 2004) were chosen based on the 
percentage of deontological, in comparison to utilitarian judgements being closest to 
50% in their study. In other words, there was little difference in the proportions of 
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non-clinical participants choosing deontological vs. utilitarian options, in response to 
those vignettes. Again, they had also been validated in previous studies, as measuring 
the same constructs. Any potential differences between these vignettes could be 
explored in the analyses. For the purposes of interpretation, these were labelled as 
‘Greene’s vignettes’ and ‘Mancini and Gangemi’s vignettes’ respectively. 
 Following established research paradigms, participants were asked questions 
following the presentation of vignettes. They were asked to imagine they were in the 
proposed scenario and asked to answer whether they should act according to the 
utilitarian action as well as whether this would be morally acceptable (yes/no). This 
was followed by visual analogue scale (VAS) questions. Specifically, participants 
were asked ‘How morally acceptable would this be?’ and given a likert scale from 
one  (completely unacceptable) to seven (completely acceptable). They were also 
asked how vivid any imagery created was, again using a scale from one to seven. 
Vignettes were all written from a utilitarian perspective, meaning that the proposed 
action was a utilitarian action. Therefore, vignettes answered ‘No’ and rated as being 
morally unacceptable indicated a deontological moral judgement. Mean scores were 
calculated, with lower mean moral acceptability scores indicating more deontological 
judgements and lower vividness scores indicating less vividness experienced in the 
imagery.  
2.4 Procedure 
2.4.1 Study procedure. When accessing the online study participants were 
initially presented with an information sheet (appendix B). If they were happy to take 
part, they were then able to proceed to a consent form for the study (appendix D). 
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Consenting participants progressed to completing the series of questionnaires detailed 
above and the set of moral dilemmas. The questionnaires were presented in the same 
order for each participant. The demographic questionnaire was presented first, 
followed by the VVQ-R, HADS, OCI-R, SUIS, Y-BOCS-SR and vignettes. On 
average, the study took participants 42 minutes to complete. Participants were 
encouraged to answer all questions however they were able to leave questions 
unanswered if they wished to. In order to ensure that unanswered questions were not 
questions participants had forgotten to answer, the programme was set such that an 
error message was displayed. This was intended to reduce the number of 
unintentionally missed questions.  
2.4.2 Compensation. First year Royal Holloway, University of London 
(RHUL) psychology students received two course credits for their participation in the 
study. All other participants, that is, non first-year RHUL Psychology undergraduates 
were given the opportunity to be entered into a prize draw. They were asked to 
provide an email address to be contacted for these purposes. Email addresses were 
stored separately from responses, on a password-protected document. No one except 
for the researcher and supervisors had access to this or to any other participants’ data. 
The prize draw was drawn after data collection had finished, in April 2016. One £50 
and two £25 vouchers were awarded to participants who had entered into the prize 
draw and who had provided an email address for contact purposes. These were 
selected at random using SPSS, contacted via their email address and sent the 
vouchers.  
2.4.3 Debrief. Debriefing procedures began by thanking participants for their 
participation. They were informed that some people may find reading scenarios, such 
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as the ones in the study, distressing and that some people may be shocked or surprised 
at the decisions they make. Participants were offered details of organisations where 
they could access support if they felt they were affected by the study and wanted 
support for this, or if they wanted information on psychological wellbeing or OCD 
(see appendix L). These organisations included Improving Access to Psychological 
Therapies (IAPT), NHS Choices, The Samaritans, contacting a GP and RHUL student 
counselling services. In the event of an emergency, and if participants were feeling at 
risk of harming themselves or were experiencing suicidal thoughts, they were advised 
to attend their local A&E department. Participants were reminded that they could 
contact the researcher and supervisors at any time to discuss any questions or 
concerns they had about the study.  
2.5 Ethical Considerations 
Full ethical approval for the study was granted by the ethics committee at Royal 
Holloway, University of London (reference number: 2015/002R1; appendix A). This 
was obtained before piloting and before any participants were recruited for the study. 
The study was informed by relevant research guidelines including the Code of 
Human Research Ethics (BPS, 2010), Ethics Guidelines for Internet-mediated 
Research (BPS, 2013) and Ethics Guidelines (RHUL, 2010) published by the 
Department of Psychology at RHUL. In addition to the general considerations of 
ethical recruitment, information, consent and confidentiality discussed above, the 
study posed two ethical issues.  
Firstly, due to the diagnostic abilities of the OCD measures, the study had the 
potential to identify clinical issues. The study was anonymous in order to increase the 
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likelihood of individuals participating in the study (Houston & Jefferson, 1975) and to 
reduce social desirability response bias (Colton & Covert, 2007). The anonymity 
however meant that it was not possible to inform individuals of potential diagnoses of 
OCD. Individuals with OCD generally have good insight into their condition (Eisen et 
al., 2001), usually recognise their compulsions as ‘pointless or ineffectual’ (ICD-10; 
2016, F42) and enter into treatment voluntarily. In light of this, it was deemed 
acceptable to provide details of support organisations, and advice to individuals to 
contact their GP if they wanted to access treatment for or information on OCD.  
Secondly, it was possible that the vignettes may have created some distress in 
individuals due to the nature of their content. However, all of the vignettes depicted 
scenarios that were uncommon and did not represent every day concerns. 
Furthermore, they did not depict content related to specific OCD concerns. It was 
therefore not anticipated that the study would cause any lasting psychological or 
negative emotional effects. Nevertheless, all participants were debriefed at the end of 
the study and were given information about where they could access support if 
required.  
2.6 Participant Feedback 
Four members of a student sample were consulted during the development of the 
study in order to gain feedback on the design and to consider making the study as 
accessible as possible. These members were recruited using convenience sampling 
(Baker et al., 2003), with an email requesting their involvement. In particular, 
feedback was elicited on different online presentation platforms as well as the 
presentation of the vignettes and the overall length of time they felt was appropriate to 
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spend on a voluntary research study. Their feedback was instrumental in shaping the 
choice of online platform, as feedback was that Qualtrics was clear and convenient to 
use. It was also possible to access it using mobile devices, which was appealing to the 
group. The group felt it was appropriate to spend 30-60 minutes completing the study 
and consideration of this, as well as the number needed in order to answer research 
questions reliably, contributed to determining the number of vignettes to be included. 
The development of the recruitment strategy was discussed and the growing use of 
social media was highlighted. It was therefore considered as a potential recruitment 
avenue.  
2.7 Piloting  
Once developed and ethical approval granted, the initial survey was piloted on a 
group of eight volunteers, two of whom had diagnoses of OCD. Again these were 
recruited using convenience sampling (Baker et al., 2003) and participated on a 
voluntary basis. Feedback from a number of the volunteers was that the study was too 
long and the vignettes repetitive. At the time, the study included eight vignettes. 
Consequently, the vignettes were reduced to six. Some typographical and presentation 
changes were also made, as a result of feedback, in order to make the study clearer to 
complete.  
2.8 Statistical Analysis 
The study was quantitative and cross-sectional in nature investigating the relationship 
between symptoms of OCD and moral judgements, as well as the potential impact of 
imagery on this relationship. Statistical analyses were used to explore each of the 
hypotheses. These analyses included Pearson’s Product Moment Correlations, 
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independent samples t-tests, Chi-square/Fisher’s Exact Tests and meditational 
analyses with bootstrapping using the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2012). Mood was 
controlled for, in all analyses, due to its association with deontological moral 
judgements (Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2006). The analyses are described in more detail 
in the Results chapter.  
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3. Results 
This chapter outlines the results of the study. The plan for analysis is described first 
and then an outline of data screening and preliminary analyses is provided. A 
description of the sample and differences between groups is then given, followed by 
the results of the main analyses in relation to each hypothesis.  
3.1 Analysis Plan 
The data were analysed using the IBM Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 
(SPSS) software, version 21 (IBM, 2012). Results are reported to two decimal places 
and exact p values are provided to two decimal places, unless p is less than .001 or 
where more decimal places are needed to represent the results of the mediation 
analyses. t values, degrees of freedom and statistical significance where equal 
variances are not assumed are reported when Levine’s Test for Equality of Variances 
was significant (less than 0.05). Alpha levels were set at p<0.05 and all hypothesis 
testing was two-tailed, in order to minimise the possibility of Type I error. As 
recommended by Nakagawa (2004) a bonferroni test was not calculated, in order to 
maintain power and minimise the possibility of Type II error, however effect sizes are 
reported where appropriate. 
3.2 Treatment of Data 
All data were downloaded from Qualtrics into SPSS by the researcher. The data were 
screened prior to analyses, following the recommendations of Tabachnik and Fidell 
(1996). This screening involved checking for any errors, ensuring that data for each 
variable were within expected ranges and that descriptive statistics such as the means 
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and standard deviations for each variable were plausible. Negatively phrased 
questions on the VVQ-R and HADS were reversed and total values were calculated 
for each measure and relevant subscales. Mean values were also calculated for the 
continuous vignette items (moral acceptability and vividness of image).  
3.2.1 Missing data. As biases in statistical analyses are more likely to occur 
when datasets include missing data (Rubin, 1987), particularly when it is not missing 
at random (Dong & Peng, 2013), missing data and any relevant patterns were 
analysed using Little’s MCAR test (Little, 1988). All variables were deemed to have 
data that were missing completely at random, due to their non-significant values (p 
greater than 0.05) (see Table 3.1).  
The values of non-missing data support the calculation of the values of 
missing data (Schafer & Olsen, 1998) and, in light of this, it is acceptable to consider 
using imputation methods for missing data in order to form a complete dataset. This 
increases power and decreases the risk of bias (Scheffer, 2002). Expectation 
Maximisation (EM; Dempster, Laird & Rubin, 1977) was selected for use in this 
study, as it is a recommended method for imputing data that is missing at random 
(Schafer & Graham, 2002). This method uses the values of non-missing data, 
combined with statistical assumptions, in order to estimate the distribution of values 
and hence missing data. EM was chosen as it is relatively simple to implement 
(Dempster, Laird & Rubin, 1977), stable (Couvreur, 1996) and, unlike Multiple 
Imputation (MI), can be used with the PROCESS mediation macro (Hayes, 2012). 
Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that there are no significant differences 
between EM and MI when used for imputation purposes (Lin, 2010).  
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Table 3.1. Little’s MCAR tests for continuous variables  
 Variable  Subscale 
Little's 
MCAR 
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale 
 
HADS-Depression 
χ2(6)=3.29, 
p=0.77 
 
 
χ2(17)=8.13, 
p=0.96 
Obsessive Compulsive Inventory-
Revised 
 
 
χ2(10)=5.36, 
p=0.87 Spontaneous Use of Imagery Scale 
 
 
χ2(65)=79.00, 
p=0.11 
Yale-Brown Obsessive- Compulsive 
Scale-Self-Report 
 
Vignettes 
Moral Acceptability 
 
χ2(20)=17.18, 
p=0.64 
How morally acceptable would this 
be? 
 
Moral Acceptability 
Greene 
χ2(6)=9.86, 
p=0.13 
 
Moral Acceptability 
Mancini and Gangemi 
χ2(2)=0.03,  
p=0.99 
Vividness 
How vivid was the image?  
χ2(11)=13.21, 
p=0.28 
 
Vividness Greene 
χ2(3)=2.74,  
p=0.43 
  
Vividness Mancini and 
Gangemi 
χ2(4)=6.61,  
p=0.16 
 
Before completing EM, the amount of missing data was also considered. 
There is not yet an established upper cut-off in the literature regarding the percentage 
of missing data for each individual on a given variable in a dataset for which EM can 
be used however guidance suggests an upper limit of 20% (Garson, 2015) or one in 
six items (17%) missing per participant. In light of the variability in these suggestions 
the most conservative suggestion was employed, therefore participants with greater 
than one in six items missing on each variable were not included in the imputation. 
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This affected twelve participants with more than 1 in 6 items missing on the Y-
BOCS-SR.  
In order to explore any potential differences between the two vignette types 
(Greene’s vignettes and Mancini & Gangemi’s vignettes), any missing data was 
explored for these sets of vignettes separately. As the author specific vignettes 
(Greene/Mancini and Gangemi) only included three questions, and therefore any 
missing value exceeded the 1 in 6 requirement, it was also not possible to include 
these in the imputation (this included three participants with moral acceptability data 
missing in response to Greene’s vignettes, one participant with moral acceptability 
data missing in response to Mancini and Gangemi’s vignettes, two participants with 
vividness data missing in response to Greene’s vignettes and one participant with 
vividness data missing in response to Mancini and Gangemi’s vignettes). Neither is it 
possible to use EM with categorical variables (two participants had one item missing 
on the VVQ-R scale), so missing data falling under either of these two categories 
were left as missing in the dataset. These missing data points were treated with 
pairwise deletion, meaning that they were not included in analyses that involved the 
variables with missing values. This method is commonly employed for managing 
missing data (Peugh & Enders, 2004), which is missing completely at random 
(Schafer & Graham, 2002). All other eligible missing data were imputed within 
Missing Values Analysis in SPSS, using EM. It is possible that more missing data 
occurred during the Y-BOCS-SR and vignettes as they were the final parts of the 
study and, by this time, participants may have been more inclined to leave items 
missing in order to finish the study. 
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3.2.2 Normality of data. The skewness and kurtosis scores of each variable 
were calculated to assess whether they were normally distributed. In order to do this, 
histograms with normal curves were inspected and skewness and kurtosis z-scores 
were calculated, both for the overall dataset and OCD and comparison groups 
separately. z-scores were deemed to be acceptable if they were below 3.29 (p<0.001) 
(Field, 2009) for the whole dataset (N=145). The small standard errors in large sample 
sizes make it acceptable to use this value as an upper limit for samples of 100 or more 
(Field, 2009; Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). For the OCD and comparison groups, 
which were smaller datasets (N=30 and N=27 respectively), z-scores were deemed to 
be acceptable if they were below 2.58 (p<0.01) (Field, 2009). Variables were 
transformed such that they all met criteria for normality (See appendix M for details 
of transformations). Where comparisons were being made between groups with 
transformed scores, the same transformations were applied to the same variables in 
both groups, even where one variable was normally distributed (Field, 2009).  
3.2.3 Outlier analysis. Extreme outliers are data points that deviate 
significantly from the other data points. It is important to be aware of these because 
they may lead to distortion of statistics, potentially causing less valid results (Field, 
2009). For this reason, outliers were checked for on each variable in each dataset 
using boxplots. Outliers were deemed to be extreme if the value was more than three 
standard deviations away from the mean of the relevant variable (Field, 2009).  
In overall dataset, results indicated one extreme outlier on the VVQ-Visual 
variable and three extreme outliers on the HADS depression variable.  There were no 
outliers on the variables within the OCD group dataset. In the comparison group 
dataset, there was one extreme outlier on the HADS depression variable. As there was 
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no reason to conclude that these data points did not belong the dataset, they were not 
removed (Field, 2009). As eliminating the variable can lead to a loss of power and the 
possibility that the data point is inappropriately viewed as not belonging to the 
dataset, the preferential method for managing any adverse impact of outliers to 
transform the variable (Field, 2009; Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). This transforms the 
distribution, bringing it closer to normality.  
Outliers were therefore assessed again following the variable transformations. 
Within the whole dataset, one outlier remained on the HADS Depression variable. 
This was winsorised, replacing the outlying score with the value of the next score and 
this was balanced by doing the same at the other end of the distribution. Following 
this, no remaining outliers were detected and all variables fell within acceptable limits 
for both skewness and kurtosis, both for the sample as a whole and for separate 
groups (OCD and comparison). It was therefore considered appropriate to use 
parametric tests, to maximise power and reduce the chances of type II errors.  
3.3 Completing Versus Non-completing Participants 
In order to learn about any possible biases in those who completed the study, and 
those who did not, differences in psychopathology and socio-demographic variables 
between groups of participants who completed the study and those who withdrew at 
various stages were compared. Participants were divided into three groups: those who 
withdrew from the study during or after the questionnaires (Time 1; N=25), 
participants who withdrew from the study during or after the vignettes (Time 2; 
N=24) and participants who completed the study (Time 3; N=145). Groups were 
compared using the data that was available.  
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Table 3.2 gives a description of these groups and shows the results of a one-
way ANOVA, which was used to compare the groups on the continuous variables 
(age, OCI, YBOCS-SR and HADS). Bootstrapping was used due to the unequal 
sample sizes (Krishnamooorthy, Lu & Mathew, 2007). Table 3.3 shows the results of 
Chi-square or Fisher’s Exact Tests (FET; used when expected cell count was less than 
five), used to compare the groups on the categorical variables. These variables were 
collapsed where appropriate, as the numbers in some individual groups were not large 
enough to produce meaningful results. As Tables 3.2 and 3.3 show, no differences 
were found between the three groups. This suggests that participants withdrew from 
the study at various stages for reasons that are not accounted for by differences in 
psychopathology or demographics.
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Table 3.2. Descriptive data for continuous variables and group differences at Time 1, Time 2 and Time 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
Group 
   
ANOVA 
  Time 1 
 
Time 2 
 
Time 3 
    Mean [S.D] Range Mean [S.D] Range Mean [S.D] Range 
 Age 28.46 [7.80] 18-49 30.75 [12.07] 16-65 27.86 [12.13] 17-70 F(2,150)=1.52, p=0.22 
HADS 14.26 [8.08] 3-30 16.38 [7.91] 3-32 14.24 [8.16] 0-38 F(2,150)=1.27, p=0.28 
OCI-R 22.00 [15.60] 4-49 25.71 [15.91] 4-60 20.85 [14.73] 0-62 F(2,150)=2.43, p=0.09 
Y-BOCS-SR 9.33 [9.02] 0-18 14.17 [12.21] 0-35 11.68 [9.98] 0-40 F(2,150)=2.29, p=0.11 
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Table 3.3. Descriptive data for categorical variables and group differences at Time 1, Time 2 and Time 3 
      Group   
χ2/Fisher's Exact Test (FET) for 
group differences 
  
Time 1 Frequency 
(%) (N=25) 
Time 2 Frequency 
(%) (N=24) 
Time 3 Frequency (%) 
(N=145) 
Gender Male 4 (16) 3 (12.50) 23 (15.86) p=1.00; FET 
 
Female 20 (80) 21 (87.50) 120 (82.76) 
 
 
Other/Missing 1 (4) 0 (0) 2 (1.38) 
 Ethnicity White British 18 (72) 17 (70.83) 98 (67.59) χ2 (2)=0.43, p=0.87 
 
Not White 
British 
6 (24) 7 (29.17) 45 (31.03) 
 
 
Missing 1 (4) 0 (0) 2 (1.38) 
 Marital status With partner 14 (56) 16 (66.67) 70 (48.28) χ2(2)=2.86, p=0.24 
 
Not with 
partner 
9 (36) 8 (33.33) 70 (48.28) 
 
 
Missing 2 (8) 0 (0) 5 (3.45) 
 Employment 
status 
Working 10 (40) 14 (58.33) 58 (40) p=0.44; FET 
 
Not working 3 (12) 2 (8.33) 17 (11.72) 
 
 
Student 8 (32) 6 (25) 63 (43.44) 
 
 
Missing 4 (16) 2 (8.33) 7 (4.83) 
 Highest 
Education 
level 
Compulsory 1 (4) 1 (4.17) 3 (2.07) p=0.64; FET 
 
Further 8 (32) 8 (33.33) 59 (40.69) 
 
 
Higher 15 (60) 13 (54.17) 78 (53.79) 
  Missing 1 (4) 2 (8.33) 5 (3.45)  
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      Group   
χ2/Fisher's Exact Test (FET) for group 
differences 
  
Time 1 Frequency 
(%) (N=25) 
Time 2 Frequency 
(%) (N=24) 
Time 3 Frequency (%) 
(N=145) 
Religion No religion 11 (44) 11 (45.83) 89 (61.38) χ2(2)=3.49, p=0.18 
 
Religion 13 (52) 12 (50) 54 (37.24) 
  Missing 1 (4) 1 (4.17) 2 (1.38)  
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Differences in those completing the study and those not completing the study 
were also explored, specifically in terms of diagnoses of OCD (see Table 3.4). As the 
group (OCD or comparison) was determined by the measures of psychopathology 
(OCI and YBOCS-SR), this group comparison was only possible for those who had 
completed these questionnaires. As the vignettes followed the questionnaires this 
comparison was therefore made between participants who started but did not 
complete the vignettes, and those who completed the vignettes. A Chi-square analysis 
showed significant differences between the groups (2(1) = 11.06, p<0.01). 
Specifically, fewer completers had a diagnosis of OCD than expected (30 compared 
to the expected 36.7) and more non-completers had a diagnosis of OCD than expected 
(13 compared to the expected 6.3). This suggests that having a diagnosis of OCD may 
have prevented participants from completing the study. Implications of this finding 
will be considered in the Discussion chapter.  
Table 3.4. Participants completing versus not completing the study and their 
diagnoses of OCD.  
  Completed     
  
Yes 
(%) 
No 
(%) 
Total 
(%) 
OCD 
   
Yes 
30 
(20.69) 
13 
(52) 
43 
(100) 
No 
115 
(79.31) 
12 
(48) 
127 
(100) 
Total 
145 
(100) 
25 
(100)   
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3.4 Group Differences  
For this part of the analyses, data is presented for all participants who completed the 
study (N=145), those with OCD (N=30) and the comparison group (N=27) (see 
Tables 3.5 and 3.6). Those in the OCD group and comparison group were compared 
to gain information on the potential need to control for any differences between these 
groups in the main analyses. Independent sample t-tests were conducted to examine 
any potential differences between the OCD and comparison groups on continuous 
variables. Chi-squared analyses (2), or Fisher’s Exact Tests (FET) (when expected 
cell count was less than five) were conducted to examine any potential differences 
between the groups on categorical variables.  
 3.4.1 Analysis of group differences in socio-demographics. Table 3.5 shows 
descriptive statistics for the overall sample, as well as the two groups respectively, on 
socio-demographic variables. An independent samples t-test was used to explore any 
differences in age, between the OCD and comparison groups. Chi-square or Fisher’s 
Exact Tests were used to explore any differences in the categorical socio-
demographic variables. Again, these variables were collapsed where appropriate, as 
some numbers in individual groups were not large enough to produce meaningful 
results. Missing data was not included in the analyses. Findings demonstrate that there 
were no significant differences between the groups, in terms of demographic 
variables.
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Table 3.5 Descriptive data and group differences (OCD and comparison groups) for demographic variables.  
      Group     
  
All (N=145) OCD (N=30) Comparison (N=27) 
Independent samples t-test for 
group differences 
  
Mean [S.D]           Mean [S.D]           Mean [S.D]          
Age in years  27.86 [12.13]       27.93 [11.19]         30.93 [12.17]      t(55)=0.97, p=0.34 
 
Range 17-70 17-67 18-60 
 
 
     
 
 
Frequency (%) Frequency (%) 
Frequency 
(%) 
χ2/Fisher's Exact Test (FET) for group 
differences 
Gender Male 23 (15.86) 4 (13.33) 6 (22.22) p=0.32; FET 
 
Female 120 (82.76) 25 (83.33) 21 (77.78) 
 
 
Other/Missing 2 (1.38) 1 (3.33) 0 (0) 
 Ethnicity White British 98 (67.59) 20 (66.67) 23 (85.19) χ2(1)=2.63, p=0.09 
 
Not White 
British 
45 (31.03) 10 (33.33) 4 (14.81) 
 
 
Missing 2 (1.38) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
 Marital status With partner 70 (48.28) 18 (60) 16 (59.26) χ2(1)=0.15, p=0.46 
 
Not with 
partner 
70 (48.28) 10 (33.33) 11 (40.74) 
 
 
Missing 5 (3.45) 2 (6.67) 0 (0) 
 Employment status Working 58 (40) 11 (36.67) 18 (66.67) p=0.12; FET 
 
Not working 17 (11.72) 5 (16.67) 2 (6.67) 
 
 
Student 63 (43.45) 12 (40) 7 (25.93) 
   Missing 7 (4.83) 2 (6.67) 0 (0)   
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      Group     
  
All (N=145) OCD (N=30) 
Comparison 
(N=27) 
  
    Frequency (%) Frequency (%) Frequency (%) 
χ2/Fisher's Exact Test (FET) for group 
differences 
Highest Education 
level 
Compulsory  3 (2.07) 2 (6.67) 0 (0) p=0.56; FET 
 
Further  59 (40.69) 8 (26.67) 8 (29.63) 
 
 
Higher 78 (53.79) 17 (56.67) 19 (70.37) 
 
 
Missing 5 (3.45) 3 (10) 0 (0) 
 Religion No religion 89 (61.38) 22 (73.33) 17 (62.96) χ2(1)=0.71, p=0.29 
 
Religion 54 (37.24) 8 (26.67) 10 (37.04) 
  Missing 2 (1.38) 0 (0) 0 (0)  
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3.4.2 Analysis of group differences in psychopathology and use of 
imagery. Table 3.6 shows descriptive statistics for the overall sample, as well as the 
two groups respectively, for the variables measuring psychopathology and imagery. 
Independent samples t-tests were used to explore any differences on these variables 
between the OCD and comparison groups. Results showed the two groups (OCD and 
comparison) to differ significantly on the HADS, OCI-R, YBOCS, but not to differ 
significantly on VVQ and SUIS. This showed the groups to be comparable in their 
use of imagery but, as expected, the OCD group had greater levels of 
psychopathology. 
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Table 3.6. Descriptive data and group differences (OCD and comparison groups) for psychopathology variables and use of imagery 
      Group       
Independent samples t- 
test 
  
All 
(N=145) 
  
OCD 
(N=30) 
  
Comparison 
(N=27) 
  
  
Mean 
[S.D] 
Range 
Mean 
[S.D] 
Range 
Mean 
[S.D] 
Range   
VVQ Total 25.48 
[2.74] 
21-32 
25.50 
[2.61] 
21-32 
24.96 
[2.83] 
21-31    t(55)=-0.75, p=0.46 
Scale range 20-40 
VVQ Visual 
12.83 
[1.93] 
10-19 
12.77 
[1.65] 
10-16 
12.70 
[2.33] 
10-18 t(55)=-0.12, p=0.91 Scale range 10-20  
Lower score= more visual cognitive style 
VVQ Verbal 
12.64 
[1.93] 
10-18 
12.73 
[2.13] 
10-17 
12.26 
[1.61] 
10-16       t(55)=-0.94, p=0.35 Scale range 10-20  
Lower score=more verbal cognitive style 
HADS Total 
14.24 
[8.16] 
0-38 
23.43 
[8.34] 
7-38 
8.62 
[3.84] 
3-20 t(41.72)=-8.74, p<0.001*** 
Scale range 0-42 
Lower score = fewer symptoms of 
psychopathology 
HADS Anxiety 
9.55 
[4.92] 
0-21 
15.07 
[3.77] 
6-21 
6.11 
[2.28] 
2-10 t(48.40)=-10.98, p<0.001*** Scale range 0-21 
Lower score = fewer symptoms of anxiety 
HADS Depression 
4.69 
[3.96] 
0-19 
8.37 
[5.12] 
0-19 
2.52 
[2.23] 
0-10 t(55)=-5.12, p<0.001*** 
Scale range 0-21 
Lower score = fewer symptoms of 
depression 
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      Group       Independent samples t-test 
  
All 
(N=14
5) 
  
OCD 
(N=30) 
  
Comparison 
(N=27) 
  
  
Mean 
[S.D] 
Range 
Mean 
[S.D] 
Range 
Mean 
[S.D] 
Range   
OCI-R 20.85 
[14.73] 
0-62 
38.70 
[11.95] 
21-62 
5.78 
[3.24] 
0-12 t(33.68)=-14.51, p<0.001*** 
Scale range 0-72 
Lower score=fewer symptoms of OCD 
      
SUIS 
37.96 
[9.63] 
13-59 
39.97 
[10.74] 
18-59 
36.81 
[10.97] 
13-55 t(55)=-1.10, p=0.28 Scale range 12-60 
Lower score=lower imagery use 
Y-BOCS-SR 
11.68 
[9.98] 
0-40 
 25.70    
[6.91] 
16-40 
1.37 
[1.74] 
0-6 t(30)=-19.55, p<0.001*** 
Scale range 0-40 
Lower score=fewer symptoms of 
OCD 
Y-BOCS-SR-COMP 
5.06 
[5.11] 
0-20 
12.27 
[4.32] 
1-20 
0.52 
[0.94] 
0-3 t(37.15)=-13.05, p<0.001*** Scale range 0-20 
Lower score=fewer compulsions 
Y-BOCS-SR-OBS 
6.50 
[5.25] 
0-20 
13.43 
[3.47] 
7-20 
0.85 
[1.06] 
0-3 t(42.95)=-17.51, p<0.001*** Scale range 0-20 
Lower score=fewer obsessions 
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Participants were also asked whether they had ever had any other diagnoses of 
mental health conditions. Seventy percent of the OCD group said that they had in 
comparison to 14.8% of the comparison group. This difference between groups was 
statistically significant (χ2(1)=18.77, p<0.001), again indicating higher levels of 
psychopathology in the OCD group and raising the possibility that participants in this 
group had multiple current diagnoses. Participants were invited to describe any other 
mental health diagnoses they had received. The numbers of participants reporting 
each diagnosis are summarised in figure 3.1. 
 
Figure 3.1. Self-report descriptions of additional mental health diagnoses.  
3.4.3 Analysis of OCD group 
Table 3.7 further describes the groups in relation to OCD. As expected, significantly 
more participants in the OCD group had a self-reported current (2(1)=40.08, 
p<0.001) as well as historical (2(1)=37.31, p<0.001) diagnosis of OCD. There were 
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also significantly more participants in the OCD group who had had treatment for 
symptoms of OCD (2(1)=26.35, p<0.001) and who were taking medication for 
anxiety (2(1)=15.09, p<0.001). All of these participants also had a score of or above 
21 on the OCI-R and 16 on the Y-BOCS-SR. 
Table 3.7 Psychopathology of OCD group 
                 Group 
      
OCD (%) 
(N=30) 
Comparison 
(%)(N=27) 
Self-report current diagnosis 
of OCD 
Yes   25 (83.33) 0 (0) 
  No   5 (16.67) 27 (100) 
  
Prefer not to 
say 
  0 (0) 0 (0) 
Historical diagnosis of OCD Yes   24 (80) 0 (0) 
  No    6 (20) 27 (100) 
  
Prefer not to 
say 
  0 (0) 0 (0) 
Treatment for OCD Yes   21 (70) 1 (3.70) 
  No   9 (30) 26 (96.30) 
  
Prefer not to 
say 
  0 (0) 0 (0) 
Medication for anxiety Yes   15 (50) 1 (3.70) 
  No   15 (50) 26 (96.30) 
  
Prefer not to 
say 
  0 (0) 0 (0) 
Other mental health 
diagnoses 
Yes   21 (70) 4 (14.81) 
  No   8 (26.67) 24 (88.89) 
  
Prefer not to 
say 
  1 (3.33) 0 (0) 
 
In summary, when looking specifically at differences between the group of 
participants completing the study and the group of participants not completing the 
study, results of the preliminary analyses showed no differences in demographics or 
variables measuring psychopathology. Diagnoses of OCD was the exception to this, 
with results suggesting fewer participants with a diagnosis of OCD to complete the 
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study, in comparison to what was expected. When looking at those completing the 
study, the OCD and comparison groups were analysed for any differences between 
these groups. Results showed no differences in regards to their demographic 
characteristics. In comparison to individuals in the comparison group, individuals in 
the OCD group showed greater levels of psychopathology. Specifically, a greater 
percentage of them had had additional diagnoses of mental health conditions, had had 
treatment for OCD and were taking medication for anxiety.  
3.5 Main Analyses  
3.5.1 Hypothesis One. OCD symptomatology will be associated with 
deontological judgements.  
In order to test Hypothesis One, a Pearson correlation explored the association 
between OCD symptomatology, as measured by the OCI-R, and mean moral 
acceptability following each vignette. Lower mean moral acceptability scores 
indicated that the proposed action detailed in the vignettes was less acceptable to 
participants and indicated a more deontological response.  
When looking at the whole sample and all vignettes, results showed a negative 
correlation between OCI-R and moral acceptability, that is, higher OCI-R scores were 
associated with lower mean moral acceptability (r(139)=-0.19,  p=0.02). Due to the 
association between depression and deontological moral judgements (Valdesolo & 
DeSteno 2006) a partial correlation was used to explore the relationship between 
OCI-R and moral acceptability, whilst controlling for the possible relationship 
between these variables and depression as measured by the HADS depression 
subscale. Higher OCI-R scores remained significantly negatively associated with 
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lower mean moral acceptability (r(138)=-0.18, p=0.03). The effect size yielded 
(r=0.18) was small to moderate (Cohen, 1988). 
As more exploratory analyses, the vignette types (Greene’s and Mancini and 
Gangemi’s) were also considered separately. When looking at Mancini and 
Gangemi’s vignettes this result remained significant (r(142)=-0.22, p<0.01), even 
after controlling for depression (r(138)=-0.22, p<0.01; small to moderate effect size 
r=0.22).  However, when looking at Greene’s vignettes, whilst trends were in the 
same direction, the correlation was no longer significant (r(140)=-0.14, p=0.10; 
r(138)=-0.11, p=0.18 when controlling for depression).  
These results were therefore in partial support of Hypothesis One, suggesting 
that greater OCD symptomatology is associated with more deontological moral 
judgements, after controlling for depression, particularly in relation to Mancini and 
Gangemi’s moral dilemmas.  
3.5.2 Hypothesis Two. People with OCD will make more deontological than 
utilitarian judgements, in comparison to those without OCD.  
This hypothesis was tested in two ways, firstly using chi square analyses to 
explore differences between groups in regards to whether they felt they should carry 
out the proposed utilitarian action in the vignette and whether this would be morally 
acceptable. Secondly, this was tested using t-tests, which explored differences 
between groups in regards to participants’ mean moral acceptability scores (how 
morally acceptable they felt the action to be).  
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In the OCD group, 106 out of 179 judgements were deontological equating to 
59.22%. In other words, 59.22% of participants in the OCD group indicated that they 
would not choose to act according to the proposed utilitarian action. In the 
comparison group, 87 out of 162 judgements were deontological, equating to 53.70%. 
However this difference was not significant between groups (see Table 3.8). The 
effect size yielded (=0.06) was less than ‘small’. 
When participants were asked whether the utilitarian option was morally 
acceptable 108 out of 177 (61.02%) responses in the OCD group were ‘no’ and 68 out 
of 162 (41.98%) responses were ‘no’ in the comparison group. A Chi Square test 
shows that this difference was significant between groups (see Table 3.8) such that 
more individuals in the OCD group said that the action (utilitarian option) was not 
morally acceptable. This finding equates to a small to medium effect size (=0.19).  
Table 3.8. Descriptive data and group differences for Hypothesis Two 
    Group 
 
χ2for group 
differences 
  
OCD 
(%)(N=30; 
180 
decisions) 
Comparison (%)  
(N=27; 162  
decisions) 
Should you/is it 
appropriate for you 
to [utilitarian 
option]? 
Yes 73 (40.56) 75 (46.30) χ2(1)=1.05, p=0.18 
 
No 106 (58.89) 87 (53.70) 
 
 
Missing 1 (0.56) 0 (0) 
 Would this be 
morally 
acceptable? 
Yes 69 (38.33) 94 (58.02) 
χ2(1)=12.29, 
p<0.001*** 
 
No 108 (60) 68 (41.98) 
   Missing 3 (1.67) 0 (0) 
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Participants were asked to rate the moral acceptability of each vignette on a 
scale of one to seven. A lower number represented a more deontological judgement. 
Whilst the OCD group had a lower overall mean moral acceptability score than the 
comparison group (3.43 (S.D=1.37) and 3.83 (S.D=1.36) respectively), an 
independent samples t-test was carried out in order to ascertain whether group 
differences existed. The results showed this difference to be non-significant 
(t(53)=1.10, p=0.28). An analysis of covariance was used to control for the possible 
effects of depression, as measured by the HADS depression scale. After controlling 
for depression, the effect of the group remained non-significant (F(1,52) = 0.12, 
p=0.73). 
Again, as more exploratory analyses, the vignette types were considered 
separately. There were no differences in the mean moral acceptability between groups 
when considering Greene’s vignettes (t(54)=0.50, p=0.62), even after controlling for 
depression (F(1,53)=0.16, p=0.69). There were also no differences in the mean moral 
acceptability between groups, when considering Mancini and Gangemi’s vignettes 
(t(54)=1.58, p=0.12), even after controlling for depression (F(1,53)=1.21, p=0.28). 
These results therefore did not support Hypothesis Two. People with OCD did 
not make more deontological than utilitarian judgements, when compared to the 
comparison group, and this did not change across the vignettes. However, results of 
the overall sample did indicate that participants with more OCD symptomatology 
generally felt the utilitarian option was less morally acceptable than those without 
OCD. 
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3.5.3 Hypothesis Three. Imagery will mediate the relationship between OCD 
and moral judgements.  
To evaluate the indirect effect of OCD symptomatology on moral judgements 
through imagery a number of mediation models were estimated using the PROCESS 
macro (Hayes, 2012), as an add on to SPSS. PROCESS is a regression-based tool for 
estimating direct and indirect effects. It uses bias-corrected bootstrapped confidence 
intervals of 1000 samples as standard and generates a sample of the distribution of the 
indirect effect. This is done by taking values from the original sample and resampling 
these 1000 times, after having replaced them, to produce estimate statistics (Hayes, 
2009). The significance of the indirect effect is based on the 95% confidence interval 
and the indirect effect is deemed to be significant when the upper level confidence 
intervals (ULCI) and lower level confidence interval (LLCI) do not cross zero. When 
this is the case, statistical significance reaches the p<0.05 level. 
This approach is widely accepted in current psychological research and is 
growing in popularity. It was selected over the more traditional causal steps approach 
(Baron & Kenny, 1986) for a number of reasons including its increased reliability for 
detecting indirect effects (MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman, West & Sheets, 2002), 
its consequent contribution to the reduction of type II error rates (Preacher & Hayes, 
2008), its robustness to violations of normality (Hayes, 2012) and lack of prerequisite 
for the association between predictor and response variables (Mackinnon, 2008). 
For these analyses, OCD symptomatology was measured using the OCI-R. 
Imagery was measured using one of three scales, in separate analyses: the VVQ 
Visual scale; SUIS (see Table 3.6 for descriptive statistics) and vividness (see Table 
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3.9 for descriptive statistics). Moral judgement was measured using mean moral 
acceptability scores, both for the vignettes together as well as Greene’s and Mancini 
and Gangemi’s vignettes individually (see Table 3.9 for descriptive statistics).  
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Table 3.9 Descriptive statistics for moral acceptability and vividness 
      
  N=145   
  
Mean 
[S.D] 
Range 
Moral Acceptability when considering both Greene 
and Mancini and Gangemi vignettes 
3.39 
[1.40] 
1.00-
6.83 
Scale range 1-7 
How morally acceptable would this [utilitarian action] 
be? 
Lower scores represent lower moral acceptability i.e. a 
more deontological response 
      
Moral Acceptability when considering only Mancini 
and Gangemi vignettes 
3.84 
[1.49] 
1.00-
7.00 
Scale range 1-7 
How morally acceptable would this [utilitarian action] 
be? 
Lower scores represent lower moral acceptability i.e. a 
more deontological response 
      
Moral Acceptability when considering only Greene 
vignettes 
2.97 
[1.59] 
1.00-
7.00 
Scale range 1-7 
How morally acceptable would this [utilitarian action] 
be? 
Lower scores represent lower moral acceptability i.e. a 
more deontological response 
      
Vividness when considering both Greene and Mancini 
and Gangemi vignettes 
4.56 
[1.61] 
1.33-
7.00 
Scale range 1-7 
How vivid was the image? 
Lower scores represent lower vividness 
      
Vividness when considering only Mancini and 
Gangemi vignettes 
4.08 
[1.44] 
1.00-
7.00 
Scale range 1-7 
How vivid was the image?  
Lower scores represent lower vividness 
      
Vividness when considering only Greene vignettes 
4.56 
[1.61] 
1.00-
7.00 
Scale range 1-7 
  How vivid was the image?  
  Lower scores represent lower vividness   
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In the first analyses, the VVQ-Visual scale was used to measure the mediatory 
effect of a trait measure of visual preference. The effects of OCD symptomatology on 
imagery (path a), the effects of imagery on mean moral acceptability, partialling out 
the effect of OCD symptomatology (path b), and the direct effect of OCD 
symptomatology on mean moral acceptability after controlling for imagery (path c) 
are presented in Figures 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4. Path c’, where OCD symptomatology 
predicts mean moral acceptability through imagery, is also represented. Coefficients 
for the models can be seen in Tables 3.10, 3.11 and 3.12 respectively. As in previous 
analyses, depression, as measured by the HADS depression subscale, was controlled 
for. Again the vignette types were analysed separately, in exploration of any potential 
differences between these. Therefore, the analyses were conducted with the overall 
moral acceptability, followed by that of Greene’s and Mancini and Gangemi’s 
vignettes separately.  
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Mediation model for overall moral acceptability. 
 
 
 
*p<0.05 
Figure 3.2. Mediation model for OCD symptomatology on moral acceptability via 
imagery 
Table 3.10. Mediation model coefficients for OCD symptomatology on moral 
acceptability via imagery.  
          Consequence       
  
  
M (VVQ 
VIS)       
Y Moral 
judgement 
Antecedent   Coeff. SE p   Coeff. SE p 
X (OCI-R) a 0.03 0.02 0.05 c’ -0.16 0.08 0.05 
M (VVQ-VIS) 
   
b -0.64 0.44 0.15 
Constant i1 3.44 0.06 0.00 i2 6.31 1.54 0.00 
*p<0.05 
Where SE=standard error, i1 and i2 = regression intercepts and coeff. = coefficient.  
As Figure 3.2 and Table 3.10 illustrate, the relationship between OCD 
symptomatology and overall mean moral acceptability was not significantly mediated 
by imagery. The significance of the indirect effect (standardised indirect effect = -
0.02) was tested using bootstrapping procedures.  The bootstrapped unstandardised 
X  
OCI-R 
M 
Imagery 
Y 
Moral 
Acceptability 
a=0.03 b=-0.64 
 
c’=-0.16 
(c=-0.18*) 
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indirect effect was -0.02 and the 95% confidence interval ranged from -.08 to .003 
meaning the indirect effect with imagery as a mediator was not statistically 
significant. The mediator could account for only approximately 11% of the total 
effect. 
Mediation model for Greene’s moral acceptability. 
 
 
 
*p<0.05 
Figure 3.3. Mediation model for OCD symptomatology on Greene’s moral 
acceptability via imagery 
 
Table 3.11. Mediation model coefficients for OCD symptomatology on Greene’s 
moral acceptability via imagery.  
          Consequence       
  
  
M (VVQ 
VIS)       
Y Moral 
judgement 
Antecedent   Coeff. SE p   Coeff. SE p 
X (OCI-R) a 0.03 0.02 0.05 c’ -0.10 0.09 0.30 
M (VVQ-VIS) 
   
b -1.08 0.50 0.03* 
Constant i1 3.44 0.06 0.00 i2 7.59 1.75 0.00 
*p<0.05 
Where SE=standard error, i1 and i2 = regression intercepts and coeff. = coefficient.  
X  
OCI-R 
M 
Imagery 
Y 
Moral 
Acceptability 
a=0.03 b=-1.08* 
 
c’=-0.10 
(c=-0.13) 
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Whilst there was a significant relationship between imagery and mean moral 
acceptability, the relationship between OCD symptomatology and Greene’s moral 
acceptability was not significant (in line with the results of hypothesis 2) and it was 
therefore not significantly mediated by imagery. This is illustrated in Figure 3.3 and 
Table 3.11. The significance of the indirect effect (standardised indirect effect = -
0.03) was tested using bootstrapping procedures.  The bootstrapped unstandardised 
indirect effect was -0.03 and the 95% confidence interval ranged from -.10 to .0003 
confirming that the indirect effect with imagery as a mediator was not statistically 
significant. The mediator accounted for approximately 25% of the total effect. 
Mediation model for Mancini and Gangemi’s moral acceptability. 
 
 
 
 
 
*p<0.05 
Figure 3.4. Mediation model for OCD symptomatology on Mancini and Gangemi’s 
moral acceptability via imagery 
 
 
X  
OCI-R 
M 
Imagery 
Y 
Moral 
Acceptability 
a=0.03 b=-0.19 
c’=-0.22* 
(c=-0.23*) 
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Table 3.12. Mediation model coefficients for OCD symptomatology on Mancini and 
Gangemi’s moral acceptability via imagery.  
          Consequence       
  
  
M (VVQ 
VIS)       
Y Moral 
judgement 
Antecedent   Coeff. SE p   Coeff. SE p 
X (OCI-R) a 0.03 0.02 0.05 c’ -0.22 0.09 0.01* 
M (VVQ-VIS) 
   
b -0.19 0.46 0.68 
Constant i1 3.44 0.06 0.00 i2 5.27 1.65 0.00 
*p<0.05 
Where SE=standard error, i1 and i2 = regression intercepts and coeff. = coefficient.  
The relationship between OCD symptomatology and Mancini and Gangemi’s 
moral acceptability was not significantly mediated by imagery. This is illustrated in 
Figure 3.4 and Table 3.12. The significance of the indirect effect (standardised 
indirect effect = -0.006) was tested using bootstrapping procedures.  The bootstrapped 
unstandardised indirect effect was -0.006 and the 95% confidence interval ranged 
from -.06 to .02 meaning the indirect effect with imagery as a mediator was not 
statistically significant. The mediator accounted for approximately 3% of the total 
effect.  
The hypothesis was also tested using the SUIS and vividness of imagery 
associated with the vignettes, in place of the VVQ-Visual scale. In all of these cases, 
results of the mediation analyses were not significant (p>0.05 in all cases as all 
confidence intervals crossed 0).  
These findings suggest that Hypothesis 3 was not supported. Neither trait or 
state imagery mediated the relationship between OCD symptomatology and moral 
judgements. However exploratory analyses showed a relationship between imagery 
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and mean moral acceptability in relationship to Greene’s vignettes. This suggested 
that imagery had a role in moral judgements.  
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4. Discussion 
In this concluding chapter, the findings of the main results are summarised and then 
discussed in the context of previous research and existing theory. The strengths and 
limitations of the study are also discussed and suggestions for future research are 
made. Finally, the clinical implications of the study are outlined and the chapter 
finishes with some concluding remarks.  
4.1 Aims 
The study aimed to improve the understanding of moral judgements in individuals 
with OCD. In particular, the study looked at the type of judgements made by 
individuals with and without OCD, when presented with hypothetical scenarios 
involving moral dilemmas, and whether the presence of imagery is implicated in how 
these judgements are made. Based on findings from research by Franklin et al. (2009) 
and Gangemi and Mancini (2015), it was proposed that greater OCD symptomatology 
would be associated with more deontological moral judgements and that individuals 
with OCD, compared to individuals in a non-OCD comparison group, would make 
more deontological than utilitarian judgements. When considering the possible 
mechanisms of this relationship, it was proposed that visual imagery would have a 
specific meditational role, supporting deontological moral judgements over utilitarian 
moral judgements (Amit & Greene, 2012). This proposition was based on the fact that 
individuals with OCD often experience frequent and persistent imagery (Lipton et al., 
2010) and so the finding that visual imagery supports deontological judgements 
would be amplified in these individuals.  
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4.2 Main Findings 
4.2.1 Summary. The findings of the study were consistent with the hypothesis 
that there are differences between the moral judgements made by individuals with and 
without OCD. Specifically, it was found that OCD symptomatology was significantly 
associated with more deontological moral judgements. However, this was only the 
case when looking at Mancini and Gangemi’s vignettes (the possible differences 
between these and Greene’s vignettes will be discussed in more detail in section 
4.2.2). That is, a greater presence of the symptoms of OCD was associated with 
making judgements based on the morality of the action involved and individual rights, 
rather than the overall consequences for the greater good, particularly in certain 
scenarios. In spite of this, the study did not find any significant differences between 
individuals with OCD and individuals in the comparison group, in regards to the 
number of deontological moral judgements they made. Although significantly more 
individuals with OCD felt that the option given to sacrifice fewer individuals, as a 
means to saving a greater number was not morally acceptable.  
In spite of the association between OCD symptomatology and deontological 
moral judgements being present, particularly in relation to Mancini and Gangemi’s 
vignettes, the current findings did not support the overall hypothesis that imagery 
mediated this relationship. This finding remained the same for all vignettes and both 
trait and state imagery use, suggesting no overall differences in the scenario or the 
type of imagery involved. However, when looking at the results in more detail, a 
relationship between trait imagery and moral judgements was found in relation to 
Greene’s vignettes. In these vignettes, the use of visual imagery over verbal imagery 
was related to more deontological over utilitarian judgements. The non-significance 
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of the overall model showed that, although trait imagery was associated with 
deontological moral judgements, it did not mediate the relationship between 
obsessive-compulsive symptomatology and moral judgements. The results are 
discussed next, with respect to theoretical implications regarding Greene et al.’s 
(2004) dual process model and the findings of Amit and Greene (2012).  
4.2.2 Theoretical understanding and implications of the current findings: 
the dual process model (Greene et al., 2004) and the role of imagery. In summary, 
the dual process model (Greene et al., 2004) proposes that deontological moral 
judgements are ‘driven by automatic emotional processes’ with utilitarian moral 
judgements being ‘driven by controlled cognitive processes’. Amit and Greene (2012) 
investigated the differences in deontological and utilitarian judgements and indeed 
found that individuals with more visual cognitive styles made more deontological 
judgements, in personal moral dilemmas. They stated that this was due to the strong 
link between emotional salience and vividness of imagery (Mathews et al., 2013) and 
found the triggering of emotional responses by imagery caused individuals to 
visualise the harmful actions more than they were able to visualise the longer term 
benefits, when given a moral dilemma like the ones used in the current study. They 
suggested that this, in turn, caused individuals to make judgements that it would be 
better not to act to harm an individual, in spite of this action saving the lives of others. 
Amit and Greene (2012) defined a deontological moral judgement as one that favours 
the rights of individuals, as opposed to the greater good. It is made based on the 
quality of the action, rather than the overall outcome. It was therefore possible that, in 
individuals with OCD, the frequent and intense visual imagery they experience (De 
silver, 1986; Lipton et al, 2010) would cause them to imagine the potential harm they 
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would be causing. This would cause them to choose not to act to cause this harm and 
transgress a moral norm, even when this would mean saving a greater number. The 
findings of the current study did not support the hypothesis that the role of imagery 
found in Amit & Greene (2012) would be amplified. In fact, the finding that imagery 
was associated with deontological moral judgements was only found when looking at 
Greene’s vignettes. That is, people with more visual imagery were more likely to 
make deontological judgements, only in relation to these vignettes. 
Due to the differences in results across vignettes, they were explored in detail 
in order to identify any potential qualitative differences. It was identified that the 
actions in Greene’s vignettes could be judged as involving a greater sense of personal 
agency and the individuals involved could be judged as being more vivid and 
vulnerable. For example, one of Greene’s vignettes states ‘To save yourself and the 
others you must smother your child to death’ and involves more vulnerable 
individuals such as ‘your baby’, ‘your oldest son’ and ‘your children’. This judgement 
was made in comparison to Mancini and Gangemi’s vignettes (e.g., ‘The only way 
you can prevent the death of the five patients is to activate a ventilation system switch 
that will divert the fumes into next room’ and less vulnerable individuals such as 
‘three ill patients’, ‘three other workers’ and ‘three people’), which were based on the 
same original vignettes but seemed to portray the individual involved as having less 
agency over the action and individuals to be less vivid.  
It is possible therefore that deontological moral judgements were only 
demonstrated in relation Greene’s vignettes as, possibly involving more agency and 
vividness, these were more likely to generate an image. In other words, it may be that 
the vignettes that involved less agency and were not as vivid were not sensitive to 
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visual imagery. This is in support of Greene et al., (2001), which suggested that moral 
judgements are more deontological in more personal moral dilemmas. It is also 
consistent with the dual process model (Greene et al., 2004), which highlights the link 
between emotional processing and deontological moral judgements, and in support of 
Amit and Greene (2012), which found imagery to support deontological moral 
judgements. However, these findings did not contribute to the understanding of the 
relationship between imagery and moral judgements, with obsessive-compulsive 
symptoms.  
The results also showed symptoms of OCD to be associated with moral 
judgements made by individuals, particularly in Mancini and Gangemi’s moral 
dilemmas. Specifically, symptoms of OCD were associated with individuals making 
more deontological moral judgements. That is, judgements in favour of individual 
rights and not transgressing moral norms in their actions. As results did not show 
imagery to mediate this relationship, alternative explanations for this finding will be 
discussed below. However, in considering the non-significant association between 
symptoms of OCD and moral judgements in Greene’s vignettes, it is possible that the 
mechanisms around moral judgements in dilemmas depicting lower levels of agency 
and vividness are somewhat different to those in moral dilemmas involving more 
agency and vividness. As the trend of the results was in the hypothesised direction 
(greater symptoms of OCD were associated with more deontological moral 
judgements) it is possible that the strength of this mechanism was affected by the 
differences across vignettes. Alternatively, it is possible that Greene’s vignettes were 
not realistic enough and did not represent every day concerns, changing the 
judgements made by individuals. This would be consistent with methodological 
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limitations raised in relation to Franklin et al. (2009) and these issues will be 
considered further in the limitations section below.  
In summary, the results of the study showed that both OCD symptomatology 
and imagery are associated with moral judgements, but not through a mediatory 
relationship. Specifically, imagery did not mediate the relationship between OCD 
symptomatology and moral acceptability, but was associated with deontological 
moral judgements, in vignettes judged to depict more agency and vividness. In 
vignettes judged to depict less agency and vividness in their moral dilemmas, 
symptoms of OCD were particularly associated with deontological moral judgements. 
The finding that there are different outcomes between the vignette types suggests that 
moral judgements are sensitive to differences in the nature of vignettes and different 
mechanisms of judgement are made when vignettes are presented differently (i.e., 
when vignettes potentially involve more or less agency and vividness). This would 
support the findings of Greene et al., (2001) however conclusions around this are 
made tentatively as the nature of the vignettes was not directly tested or validated. In 
light of the associations between emotional processing, imagery and deontological 
moral judgements (Amit & Greene, 2012; Greene et al., 2004), future research could 
include a measurement of state emotion, in order to determine any differences 
between vignettes in this area. 
When considering the relationship between OCD and moral judgements, and 
the lack of mediatory role on the part of imagery, it is possible that other explanatory 
factors such as the role of personal responsibility or deontological guilt can better 
explain their association. As they were not directly tested, firm conclusions cannot be 
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made. However, the findings suggest that they cannot be discounted and they will be 
therefore be considered next.  
4.2.3 Theoretical understanding and implications of the current findings: 
alternative models. In light of the inconclusive relationship between imagery, OCD 
and deontological judgements, the association between OCD and deontological moral 
judgements is also considered in relation to alternative theories. These will be 
considered in turn and are posed as tentative explanations due to the risks associated 
with implying causation from correlational findings. 
Heightened sense of personal over general responsibility. The association 
between symptoms of OCD and deontological moral judgements is consistent with 
the theory presented by Franklin et al. (2009). This proposed that the heightened sense 
of responsibility which individuals with OCD perceive themselves to have, especially 
in relation to situations involving potential harm (Rachman, 1993), causes them to 
make moral judgements that differ to those made by individuals without OCD. 
Franklin et al., (2009) proposed that increased levels of responsibility would either 
lead individuals with OCD to choose not to act to harm an individual (even in a 
situation where this would lead to saving the lives of many) so that they were not 
deemed to be personally responsible and did not transgress moral norms 
(deontological judgement). Alternatively they proposed that increased levels of 
perceived responsibility could lead an individual with OCD to make the decision to 
act to harm an individual, where this would prevent harm from occurring to a greater 
number (utilitarian judgement). This distinction can be seen as mirroring the 
distinction between specific appraisals of responsibility implying personal 
responsibility (e.g., I am personally responsible for my actions) and general 
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responsibility attitudes (e.g., ‘If I don’t act when I can foresee danger, then I am to 
blame for any consequences if it happens’ (Salkovskis et al., 2000; p1142), both 
found to be heightened in individuals with OCD (Salkovskis et al., 2000).  
Although Franklin et al. (2009) did not find a significant association in their 
data, trends suggested that OCD symptomatology was more associated with making 
deontological moral judgements. That is, with making judgements in favour of 
individual rights and not transgressing moral norms (i.e., they choose not to act to 
harm an individual, as this would be wrong no matter what the consequences are on 
others). This suggested that an increased sense of personal responsibility could 
explain individuals feeling more responsible for their actions and not act to harm an 
individual, even when they could act to influence beneficial longer-term outcomes for 
a greater number of people. Whilst not significant, these theoretical grounds provide a 
basis for explaining the association between OCD and deontological moral 
judgements in the current study. It is possible that the reason for their non-significant 
findings was the methodological limitation around having a small sample size (N=18 
and N=20 in the OCD and non-clinical groups respectively). The current study aimed 
to address this, having a sample of N=145 overall, N=30 in the OCD group and N=27 
in the comparison group.  
In addition to the investigation of associations between OCD and moral 
judgements, Franklin et al. (2009) also examined the proportion of scenarios for 
which their participants made deontological moral judgements. They found no 
differences in the number of deontological judgements made between individuals 
with and without OCD. The current study had similar findings, in that there were 
trends in the hypothesised direction (that individuals with OCD would make more 
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deontological judgements than those without OCD) but found no significant 
differences in the proportion of deontological judgements made by individuals with 
and without OCD (59.22% and 54.76% respectively in comparison to Franklin et al. 
(2009) who reported 55% and 46% respectively). Finding an association between 
OCD symptomatology and deontological moral judgements suggested that individuals 
with OCD would make significantly more deontological moral judgements than those 
without OCD. In spite of participants in the OCD group feeling the utilitarian action 
was less morally acceptable, this not being present in the current study indicates that 
the findings do not show a clear pattern. It may be that levels of personal 
responsibility were high enough to show an association in regards to Mancini and 
Gangemi’s vignettes, but not high enough in the individual groups to show an effect. 
Cohen (1992) also suggests that, in order to obtain a power level of .80 and α of .05, 
64 participants are needed in each group in order to obtain a medium effect size for a 
t-test. Therefore, in spite of the sample size being larger in the current study, this 
could remain a possible explanation for the lack of statistically significant difference 
between groups. As noted above, the role of responsibility was not directly tested in 
the current research, and although the findings are consistent with the model around 
personal responsibility leading individuals to make more deontological moral 
judgements no clear conclusions can be drawn regarding this mechanism as a means 
of moral judgements.  
Omission bias. Beliefs and interpretations around responsibility are key 
factors in the CB model of OCD and individuals with OCD have been shown to 
experience heightened levels of personal responsibility, especially in relation to 
situations involving potential harm (Rachman, 1993). As noted above, Franklin et 
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al.’s (2009) proposal regarding the impact of responsibility was that an increased 
perception of responsibility leads to more deontological moral judgements. In 
contrast, other researchers have proposed the role of responsibility beliefs to show the 
opposite effect, when considering moral judgements in individuals with and without 
OCD. Specifically, researchers have proposed that beliefs about responsibility 
influence the role of omission bias (Wroe & Salkovskis, 2000) and transform 
situations such that individuals with OCD are more likely than individuals without 
OCD to act to prevent harm from occurring. 
Omission bias is the phenomenon that harm resulting from action is perceived 
as less acceptable than harm resulting from inaction (Ritov & Baron, 1999). In this 
way, an action that results in harm may be perceived as less acceptable than failing to 
act to prevent harm. Wroe and Salkovskis (2000) found that individuals with OCD do 
not act in line with omission bias, when considering situations that are relevant to 
their OCD concerns. Their study concluded that, in such situations, a heightened 
sense of responsibility for potential harm led individuals with OCD to view the 
decision differently, feeling that failing to act to prevent harm is as bad as an action 
that results in the same harm, thus the decision to act to prevent harm.  
Wroe and Salkovskis (2000) explained their findings to be the result of an 
individual experiencing an intrusive thought in relation to possible harm and a 
consequent appraisal of this intrusion that they are responsible for preventing it from 
occurring.  The authors concluded that the occurrence of the intrusion and appraisal 
around responsibility means that actively ‘doing nothing’ to prevent harm actually 
becomes morally equivalent to ‘doing something’ that would have caused the harm 
and they therefore become equally as distressed, in both scenarios. This would 
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suggest that individuals with OCD are more likely to decide to act to prevent harm, 
that is, to choose the utilitarian action. The findings of the association between OCD 
and moral judgements in the current study support previous findings by Franklin et 
al., (2009), but are therefore in contrast to what may be expected from the findings 
from Wroe and Salkovskis (2000).  
However, there are several important factors that should be considered when 
interpreting these findings. Firstly, Wroe and Salkovskis (2000) found that differences 
in the moral judgements of individuals with OCD were only present if their OCD 
concerns were activated. In other words, differences between individuals with and 
without OCD were found only in scenarios that were most relevant to their OCD 
concerns. Secondly, the research on omission bias has compared judgements 
regarding scenarios where harm occurs from either action or inaction and where the 
level of harm in each condition is the same. For example, Spranca, Minsk and Baron 
(1991) created a scenario where a tennis player wanted to beat an opponent by 
inducing him to eat cayenne pepper. He knew the house salad dressing contained 
cayenne, and planned to recommend it to his opponent. In one version, the opponent 
ordered it himself so the tennis player said nothing, in another version the tennis 
player recommended it. In this scenario, the outcome is the same; the tennis opponent 
will eat the cayenne pepper. In both Franklin et al.’s (2009) study and the current 
study however, inaction results in greater harm, and action results in lesser harm, to 
different people. So, in order to save the masses, an action must be made to fewer 
individuals. Thirdly, omission bias involves action/inaction and associated harm 
whereas the distinction between deontology/utilitarianism is considered more broadly, 
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being about the transgression of moral norms and the quality of actions versus overall 
consequences.  
Omission bias in OCD has not yet been researched when both action and 
inaction result in different levels of harm, as was the case in the current study. 
Extending this principle, it may be expected that individuals without OCD judge it 
more acceptable not to act (deontological) and that individuals with OCD would not 
use this bias, and would therefore make a more utilitarian judgement, perceiving both 
action and inaction to be as bad as each other. Although Franklin et al. (2009) did not 
hypothesise a difference in any one direction the findings from their research would 
suggest that, in contrast to the proposal based on omission bias, individuals with OCD 
make more deontological judgements.  
It is possible that the lack of difference in judgements between the two groups 
in the current study indicates that the omission bias was not found. This could have 
been because the vignettes were not specifically relevant to OCD concerns. In support 
of this, Wroe and Salkovskis (2000) found no difference between individuals with 
OCD and without OCD in their ratings of scenarios about which they were least 
disturbed, suggesting no differences in general decision making. Nevertheless, the 
findings of the current study cannot conclude that lack of omission bias can explain 
the differences in findings as, in order to do this, it would have been necessary to 
control for additional differences between the studies mentioned above. It would be of 
interest in future research, therefore, to control for the action principle (i.e., present 
scenarios in which both action and inaction result in the same amount potential harm 
and where action is not always associated with the utilitarian option) and to use 
vignettes that are of particular relevance to the OCD concerns of participants. 
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Furthermore, as Wroe and Salkovskis (2000) asked participants how they would act 
and the current study asked participants whether they should behave in line with the 
utilitarian action as well as the moral acceptability of this, it would be of interest to 
ask individuals to rate both hypothetical decisions as well as moral judgements of 
acceptability. It may be that decisions to act and the moral acceptability of this 
behaviour differ. The will be further explored later in this chapter. 
Deontological guilt. The theory of deontological guilt (Mancini, 2008 cited in 
Gangemi & Mancini, 2011) can also be used to explain the association between 
symptoms of OCD and deontological moral judgements.  A feeling of deontological 
guilt is triggered by transgressing a moral norm (Basile et al., 2013), for example, by 
injuring someone or committing incest, and generally occurs in the context of a social 
event (i.e., others are involved; Baumeister, Stillwell & Heatherton, 1994). It consists 
of an evaluation of an action as being wrong, feeling responsible for that action and 
the action not being in line with one’s morals (Miceli & Castelfranchi, 1998).  In 
contrast to the theory proposed by Wroe and Salkovskis (2000), Sustein (2005) 
suggests that not acting to harm an individual (and sacrificing the lives of a greater 
number) is in fact deemed to be generally better than acting to harm an individual 
(and saving the lives of a greater number) as this means intervening less in the 
‘natural order’ of things, which is a moral transgression. This literature is relevant to 
individuals with OCD, who have not only been found to have heightened perceptions 
of responsibility, but who also have heightened feelings of guilt (Arntz, Voncken & 
Goosen, 2007).  
As the work of Franklin et al. (2009) suggests, research has found individuals 
with OCD to feel particularly responsible for their own actions and the consequences 
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of their actions, as opposed to being particularly concerned about the welfare of 
others (Dettore, 2003 cited in Mancini & Gangemi, 2011). Deontological guilt arises 
as a result of transgressing moral norms and individuals with OCD, who are more 
sensitive to issues of morality (Bhar, 2004, cited in Doron & Kyrios, 2005; Clark & 
Purdon, 1993; Salkovskis, 1989), are therefore more inclined to avoid these feelings. 
This has been supported by empirical studies showing concern about a harmful event 
to be reduced if responsibility is assigned to someone else, even if the harmful event 
still occurs (Lopatcka & Rachman, 1995). Theoretically, this implies that individuals 
with OCD would have a greater preference for inaction and not engaging in a moral 
transgression than acting to prevent harm (as suggested by Wroe & Salkovskis, 2000), 
as this means avoiding feelings of guilt and personal responsibility.     
Of note is that Mancini and Gangemi (2015) did indeed find significant 
differences such that individuals with OCD made significantly more deontological 
moral judgements in comparison to the other two groups. In contrast to the evidence 
discussed above, this suggests that individuals with OCD may make their moral 
judgements differently to individuals without OCD, even in situations that are not 
directly related to their OCD concerns.  This was further confirmed by the induction 
of deontological guilt, by giving participants scenarios involving the transgression of 
a moral rule, leading to more deontological judgements (Mancini & Gangemi, 2015). 
However, a significant difference between the current study and Franklin et al. (2009) 
is that Mancini and Gangemi (2015) recruited their participants from small 
populations in specific regions of Italy that are strongly catholic. Previous authors 
(D’Olimpio & Mancini, 2014) have stated that guilt is commonly used as a motivator 
in education systems there and it is possible that their participants therefore had 
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heightened baseline perceptions of responsibility, which are further heightened in 
those with OCD. This could be an explanatory factor for the differences in their 
findings and would be in line with the prediction of Wroe and Salkovskis (2000) that 
heightened levels of responsibility moderates the relationship between intrusive 
thoughts and moral judgements.    
In summary, the current study sought to examine whether individuals with 
OCD make more deontological than utilitarian judgements, in comparison to those 
without OCD. The results suggest that there is an association between these two 
factors, particularly in relation to Mancini and Gangemi’s vignettes, and this could 
not be explained by the role of imagery. Therefore, other factors such as the 
heightened sense of personal responsibility and deontological guilt should be 
considered. Both theories involve personal responsibility, and this can therefore been 
seen as a strong explanatory model for the findings.  
4.2.4 Summary of Theoretical Implications. The results of the current study 
suggest that OCD symptomatology is associated with deontological moral 
judgements, particularly in dilemmas that are judged to involve less agency and 
involve less vulnerable individuals. They also suggest imagery to be associated with 
deontological moral judgements, in dilemmas judged to involve more agency and 
more vulnerable individuals, but that this is independent of OCD. Although imagery 
was associated with more deontological judgements, it was not found to mediate the 
relationship between OCD and moral judgements and so the relationship between 
these variables is unclear. The association between imagery and deontological moral 
judgements, when more agency and vividness is involved, is in support of the dual 
process model (Greene et al., 2004) and the work of Amit and Greene (2012).  
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Whilst not directly tested, other models were considered as alternative 
explanations of the findings showing OCD symptomatology and deontological moral 
judgements to be associated. The findings of the current study are consistent with 
Franklin et al.’s (2009) proposal regarding the role of responsibility in the association 
between OCD and deontological moral judgements. Specifically, the findings are 
consistent with the proposal around the role of personal responsibility, as opposed to 
general responsibility, and also with suggestions that differences in decision outcomes 
are due to the unwanted guilt of transgressing moral norms (Mancini & Gangemi, 
2015). The study has raised the possibility of different mechanisms of judgement 
being used in different moral dilemmas and this requires further exploration in order 
to confirm or disconfirm. The limitations of the study and suggestions for future 
research are presented below.  
4.3 Strengths, Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
This study brings together previous research on moral judgements in OCD and 
attempted to investigate the possible mechanisms behind the differences in moral 
judgements found in individuals with OCD. It has contributed novel information to 
the field as well as confirmed some previous findings. It is however important that the 
findings are considered within the context of the strengths and limitations of the 
study’s methodology.  
 4.3.1 Design. The study employed a cross-sectional design that can be seen as 
cost and time efficient in comparison to other study designs such as case studies or 
monitoring populations over a significant period of time. However whilst cross-
sectional designs allow the collection of data from a certain point in time, and can 
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therefore aid estimations of the frequency with which patterns occur (Levin, 2006), 
they cannot be used to gain information on causality between variables (Sedgwick, 
2014), nor can they give information as to the sequencing of variables. In relation to 
the association between imagery and deontological moral judgements therefore, it is 
not possible to tell whether the imagery preceded the judgement or was elicited as a 
result of the judgement.  
Furthermore, cross-sectional designs are vulnerable to response bias, whereby 
the characteristics of participants who choose to take part are not the same as those 
who do not, potentially resulting in a sample that does not represent the population 
being studied (Sedgwick, 2014). Whilst no differences were found between those 
individuals who started but did not complete the study it was not possible to collect 
information on those who did not start the study. The data should be interpreted 
cautiously, with these factors in mind. In spite of this, cross sectional designs are 
useful in identifying associations that can then be more investigated more thoroughly 
(Mann, 2003). Indeed, the current study highlights a number of avenues for further 
investigation. 
 4.3.2 Sample. When considering methodology around sampling, it is 
important to highlight that the study used a convenience sample (Baker et al., 2003), 
and benefitted from the advantages that this methodology facilitated. Whilst these 
benefits included cost and time efficiency, this meant that the sample was self-
selected. There is evidence to suggest that education and affluence affects 
participation in online research, with more educated and affluent people taking part 
(Goyder, Warriner & Miller, 2002) as well as younger people (Moore & Tarnai, 
2002) and white people (Voight, Koepsell & Daline, 2003). Furthermore, a high 
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proportion of the sample was female, and this is not representative of the equality 
with which OCD affects genders (OCD-UK, 2016). Women being more likely to 
access support (Vessey & Howard, 1993), and more generally prepared to take part in 
research than men (Moore & Tarnai, 2002), suggests they may have been more likely 
to encounter adverts for the study. This makes the study more vulnerable to bias and 
decreases its generalisability only to be relevant to other groups with similar 
characteristics (Graziano & Raulin, 1996), who have online access. 
No differences were found between the OCD and comparison groups on 
socio-demographic variables, suggesting that the groups were well matched and the 
results found were unlikely to be a result of participants varying on these variables. 
However, 21 out of the 29 participants in the OCD group who chose to disclose 
whether they had ever had any previous diagnoses of mental health conditions stated 
that they had. This equates to 72.4%, in comparison to 14.3% of the comparison 
group. It is possible that participants had multiple current diagnoses and that, for those 
in the OCD group, these were secondary to their diagnosis of OCD. Although 
depression was controlled for in the study and this was the most commonly reported 
additional diagnosis, other mental health conditions (excluding diagnoses of 
psychosis, which was an exclusion criteria) could have had an impact on the results 
and this remains a potential confounding variable. Furthermore, there were five 
participants in the OCD group who did not report having a diagnosis of OCD. It is 
possible that they had never been diagnosed and they therefore represent a group who 
may have had very little psychological support. Nevertheless, as these participants 
met criteria for the OCD group through their scores on the OCI-R and Y-BOCS-SR, 
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they remained in the sample. This decision was made in order to maintain statistical 
power.   
Lastly, the number of participants recruited to the current study was greater 
than the number recommended by the ‘a priori’ power calculation for the primary 
correlational analysis. This increases the likelihood that statistical analyses were able 
to detect any effects that were present and reduced the likelihood of a type II error 
occurring. However, the sample was also heterogeneous in nature and collected 
through a number of recruitment sites. The characteristics of the sample population 
could therefore be seen as broad and this was facilitated in order to recruit a large 
sample and provide as high a power as possible in analyses, within the time frame 
available. In spite of this, the heterogeneous sample can also be viewed as a strength 
of the study. OCD affects many individuals, regardless of gender, ethnicity, culture, 
religion or financial status and therefore affects a heterogeneous group of people 
(OCD-UK, 2016). Being recruited from various sites, the sample can be seen as more 
representative of the population with OCD, increasing its generalisability to the 
population of interest.  
 4.3.3 Vignettes. There are several limitations of the study, which concern the 
vignettes. Firstly, although previously used and validated in similar studies, there is 
little information in the source papers as to the validation process used to confirm the 
deontological/utilitarian constructs. Furthermore, the vignettes used in the current 
study were not specifically relevant to the OCD concerns of participants. fMRI 
research has shown neurological similarities in brain activation when individuals are 
presented with both everyday and hypothetical scenarios (Greene et al., 2004) 
however, as previously discussed, it is possible that individuals would answer 
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differently if vignettes described every day scenarios which depicted dilemmas that 
were relevant to the idiosyncratic concerns of individuals. To the researcher’s 
knowledge, there are no existing published and validated vignettes, written in the 
style required, that are OCD relevant. It was not deemed feasible to develop, validate 
and use vignettes of this type within a DClinPsy research project therefore previously 
used and validated vignettes were utilised. This is an aspect of the study that could be 
usefully explored in future research. 
Secondly, the vignettes all involved life threatening dilemmas and it is 
possible that all individuals would make the same decisions, in response to such 
scenarios (Franklin et al. 2009). This could go some way to explaining the lack of 
difference between groups and possibly the different findings in relation to Greene’s 
vignettes, judged to involve more agency and vividness. In support of this, Foa et al., 
(2003) found that individuals with OCD took longer to make decisions in low-risk 
scenarios, when compared to high-risk scenarios. It may therefore be helpful to 
investigate reasoning about less dramatic moral dilemmas in order to determine 
whether this is a confounding factor. A further limitation of the interpretation of the 
vignettes, specifically the potential differences between them, is that these categories 
(agency/vividness) were determined by their qualitative features only and the 
distinctions are therefore made tentatively, due to them not having been formally 
validated as such.  
Thirdly, the way in which the vignettes are written should also be considered. 
In line with previous research, the vignettes in the current study asked whether 
participants should act according to utilitarian principles, and whether this would be 
morally acceptable. It should be considered that participants’ answers may not have 
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necessarily reflected an agreement with that principle, but a disagreement with the 
alternative option. Furthermore, vignettes used in studies in this area all involve 
acting in choosing the utilitarian option and not acting in choosing the deontological 
option. Whilst the conflict between deontological/utilitarian perspectives can be seen 
as a wider issue, involving the transgression of moral norms and the visualisation of 
the quality of the action rather than the overall outcome, it is possible that omission 
bias is confounding the overall results of such studies. It would therefore be of interest 
to replicate the study, whilst holding this constant. Future research may also include 
vignettes written from both deontological and utilitarian perspectives. 
Fourthly, there is evidence to suggest that cognitive load affects moral 
judgments (Greene et al., 2008; Van’t Veer, Stel & Beest, 2014), with it interfering 
with the formation of utilitarian moral judgements (Greene et al., 2008) and the ability 
to be dishonest (Van’t Veer et al., 2014). This raises the possibility of the 
questionnaires preceding the vignettes acting as a cognitive load and interfering with 
the judgements made by participants in the current study. In order to reduce this, the 
study could have been conducted over two time points, with the questionnaires being 
completed at a different time to the vignettes. This was not included in the 
methodology of the current study, in order to avoid sample attrition, however this 
remains a consideration for future studies.    
Finally, it is possible that differences in questioning could account for the 
conflicting results across studies. The analysis on the numbers of 
deontological/utilitarian decisions made was based on a question that asked ‘should 
you/is it appropriate for you to [utilitarian action]’ in a moral dilemma. The analysis 
on the moral acceptability of this action was based on a question asking ‘would this 
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be morally acceptable’. It was assumed, in line with the theories of reasoned action 
(Ajzen & Fishbeun, 1980) and planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1985), that people would 
act in a way that they intend and deem to be morally acceptable (Kant, 1959), and 
hence these questions are asking about a similar construct. However, there is evidence 
to suggest that this may not be the case and what individuals feel is more morally 
acceptable is not always aligned with the way in which they feel they should, and do 
act. For example, many individuals, both laypeople and medical practitioners, have 
views that euthanasia is morally acceptable however many fewer would act in 
accordance with these views, perhaps due to the laws in this area (Mitchell & Owens, 
2004). Similarly, individuals with OCD often feel ‘unfree’ and choose to do things 
they do not want to do (de Haan, Rietveld, & Denys, 2015). Indeed, this was reflected 
in the current study, where the groups did not differ on their judgements as to whether 
they felt they should choose to act according to the proposed utilitarian action, but did 
differ as to whether they thought the proposed action was morally acceptable. It is 
possible that this may have differed still, if individuals were asked what they would 
do.  
 4.3.4 Missing data. The study recruited a large number of potential 
participants (N=269) however almost 50% of these did not progress to complete the 
study (N=145) and therefore were not used in the analyses. This kind of attrition can 
introduce bias if the people who do not complete the study are qualitatively different 
to those completing the study (Schulz & Grimes, 2001). Moher, Schulz and Altman 
(2001) recommend that demographic information is provided for all participants, both 
those who have completed and not completed studies, in order to analyse any 
potential differences between groups. Whilst there were no differences in available 
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data for those participants who withdrew during the questionnaires, vignettes or those 
who completed the study, making attrition bias less of a possibility (Miller & Hollist, 
2007), it is worth acknowledging that, on the basis of OCI-R and YBOCS-SR scores, 
results indicated that having a diagnosis of OCD was associated with being less likely 
to complete the study. The difference in these two results may indicate a particular 
difficulty completing the study, particularly for those scoring in the clinical ranges. 
This may have been associated with the vignettes being particularly difficult for them 
to complete.  
Missing data missing at random for those participants completing the study 
were imputed using Expectation Maximisation (EM). Due to missing data being small 
and missing at random, this was deemed to be an acceptable solution that minimised 
any bias arising from missing data (Scheffer, 2002). Unfortunately, it was not possible 
to use this method on missing data in the vignette variables and excluding them from 
analyses decreased the number of participants available for these analyses. This 
strategy is only valid when data is missing at random due to the risk of biasing the 
results (Shafer & Graham, 2002). However this was the case in the current study and 
suggests that employing this method did not have any adverse consequences on the 
results.  
 4.3.5 Measures. The study relied on the use of self-report measures, and was 
completed by participants individually, in an environment of their choice. Whilst this 
could be considered a strength of the study, and may have contributed to an increased 
rate of recruitment and elimination of the impact of unfamiliar surroundings 
distracting participants, Plous (1993) reported that self-report measures can lead to 
more socially acceptable rather than truthful responses, and therefore bias results. 
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There is a possibility that this occurred in the current study, particularly as 
participants were asked to make difficult decisions that resulted in death, albeit in 
hypothetical scenarios. Although precautions were taken to mitigate against this, such 
as ensuring the study would be completed anonymously and without the presence of a 
researcher, this should still be a consideration.  
The measures selected for use in the study had good reliability and were well 
validated however the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV (SCID; First, 
Spitzer, Gibbon & Williams, 1996) is a ‘gold standard’ (Shear et al., 2000) diagnostic 
tool for the diagnosis of major DSM-IV diagnoses, such as OCD. It has reliability 
scores of between kappa = 0.40 (Skre, Onstad, Torgersen & Kringlen, 1991) and 0.70 
(Zanarini & Frankenburg, 2001), for diagnoses of OCD and its validity is deemed to 
be superior to clinical interviews alone (Basco et al., 2000). Similarly to the 
methodology used in Mancini and Gangemi (2015) and Franklin et al., (2009), it 
would have been ideal to use the SCID in the current study, in order to establish 
diagnoses of OCD however due to the fact that it is clinician administered it was not 
deemed possible to use, in the context of a DClinPsy research project. This 
assessment tool would have compromised the anonymity of the participants and the 
additional time taken to administer and the follow up with a phone call or meeting 
may have meant that fewer participants would have been willing to take part.  
4.4 Summary of Suggestions for Future Research 
A number of suggestions for future research have been made throughout this chapter. 
For clarity, they will also be summarised next. In light of the differing levels of harm 
caused by both action and inaction in the vignettes used in both previous and the 
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current study, it would be of interest to control for these factors. This would mean 
presenting scenarios in which both action and inaction result in the same amount 
potential harm as well as scenarios giving options both involving action or inaction. 
In further regard to the vignettes, future research could develop and validate moral 
dilemmas, which are specifically relevant to OCD concerns, with the view of 
activating these concerns for individuals and then analysing whether the moral 
judgements of individuals with OCD differ to those of individuals without OCD. 
Furthermore, future studies could employ the use of low-risk scenarios and real life 
dilemmas, in order to monitor any differences in the moral judgements of individuals 
with OCD, in relation to these and ensure that the responses are not affected by 
avoidable cognitive load. It would also be of great interest to look further at the 
qualitative differences between Mancini and Gangemi’s and Greene’s vignettes, in 
order to firmly establish any differences between them, and to study the effect of this 
on the moral judgements of individuals with OCD. This could include the 
measurement of any differences in state emotion elicited by the vignette types, for 
example by including an emotion wheel such as that developed by Scherer (2005). 
4.5 Clinical Implications 
The findings of the present study have a number of relevant clinical implications, 
which will be discussed next. CBT is currently considered to be the treatment of 
choice for OCD (McKay et al., 2015) and is therefore recommended in the guidelines 
of the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE, 2005). Over the 
years, the prognosis for those in treatment for OCD has improved significantly (Lack, 
2012). However 30-40% of individuals still do not make clinically significant 
progress (Kulz & Voderholzer, 2011).  
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OCD is heterogeneous in its presentation (McKay et al., 2004) and it is 
common for it to present alongside other mental health problems (Abramowitz et al., 
2008). In spite of its complexity, it is considered crucial that CBT is tailored to the 
idiosyncratic presentation of OCD (Wilhelm & Steketee, 2006) and it consequently 
now targets specific difficulties such as the interpretation and meaning of 
responsibility (Salkovskis, 1985), perfectionism (Pleva & Wade, 2006) and 
intolerance of uncertainty (Lind & Boschen, 2009). The findings of the current study 
advocate for the additional consideration of moral judgements in the treatment of 
OCD. They have implications, particularly within cognitive work, for the 
consideration of the type of moral judgements individuals make.  
The findings of this study suggest that individuals with symptoms of OCD may make 
moral judgements differently from those without OCD, although conclusions 
regarding the specific mechanisms of these judgements cannot be made. Specifically, 
the findings suggest that increased OCD symptomatology is associated with making 
judgements that favour individual rights and focus on particular qualities of actions, 
rather than overall outcomes. Based on these results, psychological therapists may 
wish to consider building specific support on decision making, specifically in moral 
judgements, into their treatment protocols. For example, this could include 
specifically asking about how decisions are made, to elicit potential beliefs about 
responsibility or morality and make a judgement as to the extent to which individuals 
are able to think flexibly and consider the overall picture in a decision, as opposed to 
being limited to factors closest to them. Depending on the outcome, treatment may 
consider supporting individuals to gain greater psychological flexibility and build 
insights into overall, longer-term outcomes of their actions, bringing a more balanced 
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picture to decision making and supporting individuals to make informed decisions.  
If, as the study suggests, OCD is associated with deontological judgements 
and, as Franklin et al. (2009) suggest, that this is mediated by heightened perceptions 
of personal responsibility then it may be of significant importance to assess for and 
incorporate work on assessing and gaining insight into responsibility. Methods to 
address guilt and responsibility interpretations have already been developed 
(Salkovskis, 1999; Van Oppen & Arntz, 1994) and challenging beliefs around and 
appraisals of responsibility may make it easier for patients to choose to engage or not 
to engage in compulsions.  
Furthermore, it is possible that not transgressing moral norms is particularly 
important for individuals with OCD and this may contribute to their compulsive 
behaviours (Mancini & Gangemi, 2015). If this is the case, it may indicate the benefit 
of some focussed therapeutic work on morals. Specifically, this could include what 
individuals feel is right and wrong, how they feel if they do not behave in line with 
these morals and thinking about other perspectives alongside their costs and benefits.  
Research has shown early experiences and vulnerability to lead to negative self-
evaluations in areas associated with morality (Doron et al., 2008) and individuals with 
OCD are often vigilant to intrusive thoughts, particularly those of a moral nature. 
Supporting individuals to become aware of these and manage any associated feelings 
of guilt or discomfort could be of benefit, as could a focus on weighing up the impact 
of a transgression of a moral rule, with the wider picture in view.  
In summary, more targeted and tailored interventions, aimed at increasing 
psychological flexibility, could support individuals with OCD to have a greater 
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understanding of the judgements they make in moral dilemmas. This in turn could 
enable them to act, or not act, in ways that fit with their intentions, reducing the 
distress they experience from their symptoms. Indeed, a greater understanding of the 
underlying fears of individuals of OCD has been shown to lead to improved outcomes 
as therapeutic work can be more specifically tailored (Huppert & Zlotnik, 2012). 
More specific and successful treatments will therefore not only have important 
implications for clinical outcomes but also service-wide outcomes.  
4.6 Summary 
The results of the present study add to the literature on moral judgements in OCD. 
Specifically, they give additional support for OCD symptomatology being associated 
with making judgements about acceptability of action/inaction in favour of individual 
rights and not transgressing moral norms, at the expense of the greater good. This has 
implications for the decision-making process and hence initiation of compulsive 
behaviours. Significant differences were found between individuals with OCD and 
those without OCD feeling that the utilitarian option was morally unacceptable, with 
more individuals with OCD deeming it be to more unacceptable. If the assumption, 
generally accepted in the literature, that deontological and utilitarian decisions are on 
a continuum, with each being at either end, this result would go some way to further 
supporting the hypothesis that the individuals in the study with OCD were more 
inclined to make deontological decisions.  
Given the association found in the study but the lack of clarity over the 
differences between OCD and comparison groups, it would be reasonable to conclude 
that further consideration is warranted in order to firmly establish whether individuals 
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with OCD make moral judgements in a way that is different to individuals without 
OCD. Whilst limited causal inference can be made from the current research, findings 
suggest that there may be some differences and it is concluded that the types of 
decisions individuals with OCD tend to make could beneficially be considered during 
psychological interventions, in order to support them to understand their decision 
making processes, and any biases they have in making these. Further to strong 
theoretical grounds in the literature, this study attempted to establish the impact the 
presence of imagery had on moral judgements. Whilst it was possible to determine a 
relationship between imagery and deontological moral judgements, this did not have a 
mediatory role in the relationship between OCD and deontological moral judgements. 
It may be prudent therefore to consider a heightened sense of personal responsibility, 
particularly in relation to the transgression of moral norms, to be a more reliable 
explanation for the findings however the study, nevertheless, raises suggestions for 
future research in order to further understand the mechanisms of moral judgements in 
individuals with OCD.  
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Appendix B: Participant Information Sheet 
 
Information Sheet 
 
Moral Judgements 
  
My name is Alexia Trafford and I am a research student at Royal Holloway, 
University of London. I am carrying out a study on the way in which we make moral 
judgements.     
 
What is the purpose of the study?   
 
Specifically, I am interested in learning about the similarities and differences between 
the ways in which people with Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) and those 
without OCD make moral judgements. In order to do this, I would like to look at the 
similarities and differences in the moral judgements of as many adults as possible, 
whether they suffer from OCD or not. I would appreciate your participation, because 
a better understanding of how moral judgements are made could help us to gain a 
greater insight into compulsive behaviours associated with OCD.       
 
What should I do if I would like to find out more?   
 
If you wish to discuss any aspect of the research with me, please email 
alexia.trafford.2013@live.rhul.ac.uk. Alternatively, you can contact me by telephone 
on: 01784 414012. My study is being supervised by Dr Olga Luzon and Dr Abi Wroe. 
If you would like to discuss any aspect of the research with them, you can contact 
them by email at Olga.Luzon@rhul.ac.uk/Abigail.Wroe@rhul.ac.uk.      
 
What will the study involve?   
 
If you decide to take part, I will ask you to complete an online survey which will 
include some questionnaires and a series of moral dilemmas for you to read and 
answer questions on. This will take around an hour and further information about the 
study will be provided at the end.       
 
Who will see my information?   
 
Nobody except for myself and my supervisors will be allowed to see your answers. 
You will be known only by number so your answers will remain completely 
confidential. If the results of this study are published, any information you give will not 
be identifiable as yours.       
 
Do I have to take part?   
 
You do not have to answer all of the questions, if you don’t want to. Similarly, you do 
not have to take part in this study, if you don’t want to.  If you decide to take part you 
may withdraw at any time without having to give a reason. You can also ask for your 
data to be destroyed. If you are a student at Royal Holloway, University of London, 
your decision about whether or not to take part will not affect your education in any 
way.     
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Please feel free to ask any questions before you complete the consent form below. 
Your consent will be stored separately from the anonymous information you provide 
for the research project. This study has been reviewed and approved by the 
Psychology department's internal ethical procedure at Royal Holloway, University of 
London.      
 
 
Prize draw   
 
Your participation will entitle you to enter a prize draw, where you will have the 
opportunity to win £50/£25 (not applicable to students gaining credits). You will also 
have the opportunity to receive information about the results of the study.  If you wish 
to be entered into the prize draw, or to receive a summary of the results of the study, 
please provide your email address at the end of the study. Your email address will 
only be used for these purposes, and will be stored in a part of the database that is 
separate from other responses, so there will be no connection between your identity 
and your answers. Your email address will not be shared with anyone else.        
 
What If There Is A Problem?   
 
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, please contact me, Alexia 
Trafford or my supervisors, Dr Olga Luzon or Dr Abi Wroe. We will do our best to 
answer your questions.   
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Appendix C: Example Participation Advert 
 
 
 
Not included due to copyright restrictions 
 
 161 
Appendix D: Participant Consent Form 
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Appendix E: Demographics Form 
 
Demographics 
 
1. What is your age? 
 
 
 
2. What is your gender? 
 
Male 
Female 
Other 
Prefer not to say 
 
3. What is your ethnic group?  
 
White English/Welsh/Scottish/northern Irish/British 
Irish 
Any other white background 
 
White & black Caribbean 
White & black African 
White & Asian 
Any other mixed/multiple ethnic background 
 
Indian 
Bangladeshi 
Pakistani 
Chinese 
Any other Asian background 
 
African 
Caribbean 
Any other black/African/Caribbean background 
 
Arabic 
 
Any other ethnic group 
 
Prefer not to say 
 
4. What is your marital status? 
 
Single 
Married 
With partner 
Any other marital status 
Prefer not to say 
 
5. What is your employment status? 
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Employed 
Unemployed 
Retired 
Student 
Homemaker 
Any other employment status 
Prefer not to say 
 
 
4. Do you have a diagnosis of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD)? 
 
Yes 
No 
Prefer not to say 
 
5. Have you ever had a diagnosis of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD)? 
 
Yes 
No 
Prefer not to say 
 
6. Have you ever had any treatment for symptoms of Obsessive-Compulsive 
Disorder? 
 
Yes 
No 
Prefer not to say 
 
7. Are you taking any medication to help with anxiety? 
 
Yes 
No 
Prefer not to say 
 
8. Have you had ever had any other diagnoses of mental health conditions? 
 
Yes 
No 
Prefer not to say 
If yes, please specify 
 
 
9. What is your highest education level? 
 
GCSE or equivalent 
A-Level or equivalent 
Bachelor’s Degree level or equivalent 
Master’s Degree or equivalent 
Doctoral Degree or equivalent 
None of the above 
Prefer not to say 
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10. What is your religion?  
 
No religion 
Christian (Including Church of England, Catholic, Protestant and all other Christian 
denominations) 
Buddhist 
Hindu 
Jewish 
Muslim 
Sikh 
Any other religion 
Prefer not to say 
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Appendix F: Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Not included due to copyright restrictions 
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Appendix G: Verbaliser-Visualiser Questionnaire-Revised (Kirby et al.,1988) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Not included due to copyright restrictions 
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Appendix H: Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory-Revised (Foa et al., 2002) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Not included due to copyright restrictions 
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Appendix I: Spontaneous Use of Imagery Scale (Reisberg et al., 2003) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Not included due to copyright restrictions 
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Appendix J: Yale-Brown Obsessive-Compulsive Scale – Self-Report (Baer, 1991) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Not included due to copyright restrictions 
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Appendix K: Vignettes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Not included due to copyright restrictions 
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Appendix L: Participant Debrief Sheet 
Debrief Sheet 
 
Moral Judgements  
 
Thank you for your participation in the study. Many people are interested in moral 
dilemmas and often enjoy thinking about what is right and wrong. For many years, 
philosophers and psychologists have conducted research in order to learn more 
about how people make judgements in moral dilemmas.  
 
This study aims to contribute to this growing topic. Specifically, I am hoping that the 
study will help to gain a better understanding of how moral judgements are made in 
OCD and the mechanisms that might be used for these judgements. Some people 
think in a more visual way, some in a more verbal way. I am interested in the ways in 
which people think about decisions and how this might influence the decisions they 
make. I hope that the results will give greater insight into compulsive behaviours 
associated with OCD.    
 
Some people find reading scenarios, such as the ones in this study, distressing and 
feel uncomfortable about answering questions on them. Some people can also be 
shocked or surprised at the decisions they make and what they think is morally 
acceptable might not be what they would actually do. If you felt uncomfortable or 
distressed and would like to access some support for this, or you would like some 
information on psychological wellbeing or OCD, details of organisations where you 
will be able to access this support are listed below:    
 
·       Improving Access to Psychological Therapies (IAPT) is a national NHS 
programme that provides support for depression and anxiety disorders. You can find 
your local IAPT service at www.iapt.nhs.uk    
 
·       NHS Choices provides information from the NHS on a range of conditions, 
treatments, local services and healthy living. You can access this online at 
www.nhs.uk    
 
·       The Samaritans are available 24 hours a day to provide confidential emotional 
support for people who are experiencing feelings of distress, despair or suicidal 
thoughts. They can be reached in a number of ways. For the fastest response, it is 
best to telephone them. Tel: 08457 90 90 90; Email: jo@samaritans.org; Web: 
www.samaritans.org.   
 
  ·       Your GP is able to provide information and support as well as make referrals 
to other organisations for specialist support.    
 
·       If you are a student at Royal Holloway, University of London (RHUL), the 
RHUL student counselling services offer counselling sessions. You can arrange an 
appointment by calling them on 01784 443 128 or emailing them at 
counselling@royalholloway.ac.uk. Alternatively, you can go to office FW171 Monday-
Friday 9am-12pm, 1pm-4pm to arrange an appointment in person.    
 
·       IN AN EMERGENCY, for example, if you feel you are at risk of harming yourself 
or you are experiencing suicidal thoughts, please visit your local Accident & 
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Emergency department. 
 
 
Should you have any further questions or concerns, or wish to discuss any aspect of 
the study please contact alexia.trafford.2013@live.rhul.ac.uk 
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Appendix M: Details of Variable Transformations 
Table 5.2. Transformations 
    z scores     z-scores post transformation 
Group Variable skew kurtosis transformation skew kurtosis 
  
      Overall VVQ-Visual 2.64 0.49 Square root 1.72 -0.76 
 
HADS Depression 5.93 1.82 Square root -0.54 -0.69 
 
OCI-R 3.93 -0.28 Square root 0.17 -1.23 
 
YBOCS 5.03 0.86 Square root -0.22 -1.31 
 
      
Comparison Group HADS Depression 3.49 2.09 Square root -0.55 0.53 
       OCD Group HADS Depression 0.57 -0.82 Square root -2.05 0.92 
 
 
